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The growing effort to reduce large public deficits  The first step in designing a scheme to
and to increase welfare by improving the effi-  reduce redundancy is to be clear about what the
ciency of resource allocation is leading many  optimal pay and employment policies are in a
governments to concentrate on the problem of  given system and environment.  Svejnar and
sizable, costly labor redundancy in the public  Terrell discuss some of these policies and the
sector. The existence of such redundancy has  tradeoffs involved.
been acknowledged but its severity has been
underestimated.  And its effect on the budget is  They also present a framework for identify-
signif-icant,  as th,e  wage bill is usually the largest  ing labor redundancy within different countries
component of the public budget.  whose social welfare functions vary in the
relative weight given to efficiency and equity.
Svejnar and Terrell focus on what deter-  They give a rule of thumb for identifying labor
mines labor redundancy in selected modes of  redundancy where the government's  main goal is
transport (rails, ports, and buses) in six countries:  maximizing GN  '.  They show that the private
Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and  and social assessments of labor redundancy can
Yugoslavia.  They also analyze different ap-  differ substantially and that the private assess-
proaches for solving the problem.  ment is not always the appropriate measure.
They conclude that analysis of the labor  They show that redundancy-reduction
redundancy problem in public transportation  schemes can have a high rate of return and still
enterprises has been neglected because conceptu-  be socially acceptable.  Long-term savings on the
ally it is not a simple, easily identifiable phe-  wage bill can be high enough that compensation
nomenon and because its treatment is often  to employees laid off can be set fairly high and
politically controversial, as it affects social  still allow the government to recoup its costs in a
welfare.  Governments tend to approach the  relatively short time.
problem only when circumstances are extreme
(budget stress or near-complete breakdown of  But cash flow problems may necessitate the
the transport system).  Solutions arc then ham-  assistance of international donor agencies.
mered out in a tense environment, with no  Attention must be paid to how this compensation
longer-term visioIl of the optimal employment  is administered, as it can make a difference to the
and pay practices.  workers' welfare.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsCompl: x. An objective of the series is to gct thesefindings outquickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The l.ndings, interprctations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
.Nroducedl  by the P  _ Dissemination CenterTABLE OF CONTENTS
1.  A Conceptual  Framework  for Identifying  and Treating  Labor  Redundancy  2
1.1  Theoretical Aspects of Optimal Employment and Pay Policies  2
1.2  Implications for the Design of Redundancy Schemes  7
1.2.1  Deternining the Level of Redundancy  7
1.2.2  The Framework  for Selecting  an Optimal Redundancy Scheme  9
1.2.3  Monitoring  and Adjustment of Schemes  10
2.  The Determinants  of the Redundancy  Problem  10
2.1  Principal Sources of Labor Redundancy  10
2.1.1  Decline in Demand  11
2.1.2  Financial Constraints  12
2.1.3  Government Hiring  and Firing  Practices  12
2.2  Factors Preventing Reductions in Employment or Wages  13
2.2.1  Manning Ratios  14
2.2.2  Geographical  and Organizational  Constraints  15
2.2.3  Labor Legislation  and Custom  15
2.3  Factors Leading to a Decision to Reduce Excess Labor  16
3.  Findings on the Extent  of Redundancy,  Policies and Schemes  17
3.1  Methods Used to Identify the Extent of Redundancy  17
3.2  Findings on the Extent of Labor Redundancy  19
3.3  Nature of the Policies and Redundancy Schemes  20
3.3.1  The Decision  Making Process  21
3.3.2  Voluntary  vs. Involuntary Nature and Time Frame  21
3.3.3  Retirement  22
3.3.4  Redeployment  22
3.3.5  Restrictions  on Hiing  23
3.3.6  Training  23
3.3.7  Reduction of Restrictive Work  Practices  23
3.3.8  Privatization  25
3.4  The Compensation Package  25
4.  Evaluadon and Lessons for Policy  26
4.1  The Main Findings  26
4.1.1  The Severity  of the Problem  26
4.1.2  Costs and Benefits of Redundancy Schemes  27
4.2  Methodological and Policy Issues  29
4.2.1  The Complexty of the Issue  29
4.2.2  Identification  of the Extent of Redundancy  30
4.2.3  The Design and Implementation of Schemes  32
4.2.4  Monitoing, Evaluation and Policy  Adjustment  36
4.2.5  Sustainability  36
4.3  Conclusions  37This research was supported by the World Bank under RPO 675-21 and by  the Transport
Division, Infrastructure & Urban Development  Department.  We would like to thank Alice
Galenson  and Jeffrey S. Gutman for their comments  on earlier drafts.LABOR  REDUNDANCY  IN STATE  OWNED  TRANSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES:
DETERMINANTS  AND SOLUTIONS
The growing  effort to reduce large public budget deficits and to increase welfare by improving
the efficiency of resource allocation is leading many governments to concentrate on the problem of
sizable and costly  labor redundancy in the public sector. Although the existence of some public sector
redundancy  has  been  gencrally acknowledged, the  severity  of  the  problem  has  been  widely
underestimated.  A closer examination of the situation suggests that in many countries over 20% of
the  public sector labor force is deemed redundant and  that  in some countries the percentage is
considerably higher. Since the wage bill is usually  the largest cemponent of the public sector budget,
the effect of labor redundancy on the budget, efficiency  and welfare can be substantial.
Our study has been mot-vated by the fact that there has been little systematic analysis  of the
problem and of the substantive and diverse efforts of  countries to cope with it. The study focuses on
the determinants and solutions to labor redundancy in selected modes of transport (rails, ports, and
buses) operated by the public sector. The focus on the state-owned transport enterprises, as opposed
to the public sector at large, stems from both the perceived severity of the labor redundancy problem
and the availability  of precise performance measures in this subsector.'
T he analysis  is based primarily  on case studies of six  countries (Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Mauritius,
Sri Lanka, and  Yugoslavia), which at various points  in time  accumulated significant amounts of
redundant labor and adopted a variety of approaches to solve the problem. This study summarizes  and
draws conclusions from the detailed comparative analysis  of these countries. 2 However, information
from a number of other contexts is also used in order to further exemplify  various findings.
The study is divided into four parts. In the first part we outline a conceptual framework for
analyzing  the extent of labor redundancy and designing  policy  solutions. This part is motivated by the
fact that the concept of labor redundancy is frequently not clearly understood and that policies often
lack solid conceptual grounding. In Part  2, we provide a practical background to  the problem by
identifying  the principal causes of labor redundancy, factors preventing an adjustment in employment
or wages and factors that lead to decisions to reduce excess labor. In Part 3 we discu.-s  the methods
that are usually employed to identify redundancy, tne findings on the extent of redundancy and the
resulting policies and redundancy schemes. Part 4 contains evaluation and lessons for future policy
work in this area.
'The labor redundancy problem is arguably equally severe in the civil service, but the ability to
measure productivity  and hence estimate the nature and extent of labor redundancy in this subsector
is extremely limited.
uThe  six individual  country studies are presented in the following  separate volumes: Svejnar and
Terrell (1991a,b), Svejnar and Tutu (1991), Svejnar and Skreb (1991), and Terrell (1991a,b).
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1. A CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
FOR IDENTIFYING  AND TREATING  IABOR REDUNDANCY
In dealing with labor redundancy in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy makcers  need to
comsider  two important questions:
(a)  what  are the optimal employment and  pay policies that  minimize the emergence of
redundant labor while promoting efficiency  and social welfare, and
(b) how to assess causes and extent of labor redundancy and design optimal schemes to reduce
redundant  labor in situations where redundancy has arisen and needs to be dealt with.
The identification  of optimal employment  and pay policies is important because they determine
how the SOEs would operate in a steady state without labor redundancy or other major inefficiencies.
These policies should therefore result in practices that are both consistent with the maximization  of
social welfare  at  the  national level  and  elicit efficient management  of  the  SOE.  Hence,  the
identification of the optimal steady state employment and pay policies is also a prerequisite for the
determination of the causes and extent of labor redundancy and a succecfu! design of schemes aimed
at reducing labor redundancy  when it becomes a problem. They serve as a target to which the scheme
should provide an optimal trajectory.
A conceptually useful approach to the problem starts from the premise that employment and
pay policies as well as labor redundancy schemes should be consistent with the maximization  of the
society's obiectives. .Iow this task is accomplished in turn depends on the country's socio-economic
system and environment. The system is usually  defined as the endogenously determined set of laws,
institutions, organizational  structures, and accepted practices,  while the environment reflects the given
level of technology, prices and resource endowments. The optimal employment and pay policies and
redundancy schemes thus depend on  the social welfare preferences and  the existing system and
environment. As we show below, in some cases (e.g. until recently Brazil and Yugoslavia)  the social
preferences, as reflected in the overall government policies as well as the  legal and institutional
framework  (system), were accepted as immutable.  Other cases (e.g. those of Chile, recently Brazil and
to  a  lesser extent  Ghana)  exemplify  situations where the incoming governments had  significantly
different  social  and  economic philosophies than  their  predecessors,  imposed  different  social
preferences, and changed the main systemic  features (laws, institutions and practices).
In the next section, we examine the theoretical aspects of optimal employment and pay policies.
This is followed  with a discussion of the implications of the theoretical principles for the design and
implementation of optimal redundancy schemes.
1.1  Theoretial Aspects of Optimal Employment  and Pay Policies
As we indicated above, the optimality of  any given set  of policies depends on  the social
preferences and the principal systemic  features. In the labor area, the spectrum of relevant social
preferences, laws and institutions spans a w'ide  range. On the one extreme is a free market system
where the employment and pay practices are determined solely  by the employers and employees. This
system  is characterized by little (to no) protective labor legislation  or unions. At the other extreme one
finds a  highly socially oriented  system with  considerable government  intervention  (e.g.  legally3
guaranteed job security), but  also government imposed limits on the existence of restrictive work
practices. Among our studies, Chile under Pinochet represents an example  of the former and pre-1990
Yugoslavia  of the latter case. Between the two extremes lie various cases, with their salient features
being the p._sence of economically  (rather than politically)  oriented trade unions, collective  bargaining
and  restrictive work practices. The  two extremes are very different philosophically, but  they are
surprisingly  similar in their avoidance of restrictive work practices. The intermediate cases frequently
lack the legal guarantees of job security,  but the presence of unions and collective bargaining usually
leads to the instituting of contractual provisions  in this area.
Since labor redundancy implies that the labor force of an enterprise is excessive relative to
some optimal employment level, we next outline the criteria for determining optimal employment in
different systemic and environmental settings. We note  that in some cases there  is no difference
between  the  optimal employment policies of  state  and  privately owned enterprises.  In  other
circumstances the difference may be substantial.
We s.art with the case of a nonunion firm operating in a free market setting. The benchmark
form of employment and pay practices in this setting is the spot market, a concept that reflects the
traditional textbook  example of a highly  flexible  market in which employment  and wages adjust instantly
in response to changes in the relevant exogenous factors. At the level of a given firm, the employer
freely adjusts employment so  as  to  equate  labor's marginal product R  to  the  market  clearing
competitive wage W,  (R = WJ). Apart from providing  an important yardstick  for evaluating different
labor market practices,  the spot labor market has numerous real world manifestations.  Spot market type
practices are frequently observed in circumstances where specific human capital is unimportant and
effort is easily monitored (e.g. casual port workers). High labor turnover does not  have a neg  ative
effect on production and  the reliance on temporary contracts based on spot market wages is the
optimal strategy for the employer. Workers are paid competitive  wages and the lack of job security and
unimportance of firm-specific  human capital means that labor redundancy either does not arise or, if
it does, it is not a lasting phenomenon.
If worker effort is important but not easily  observable, optimal employment practices are often
believed to reflect the so called efficiency  wage  principle. In this setting the employer can again freely
adjust employment but  finds it profitable to pay above market wages (W >  WJ) in order to elicit
greater worker effort (prevent shirking). Greater effort is forthcoming because the worker fears the
loss of the wage premium if his performance were deemed inadequate and his employment (wage
premium) terminated. 3 For our purposes, the efficiency  wage system differs from the spot market only
in that the wage is set by the employer above the market clearing level and the optimality  criterion for
employment -- the equality between labor's marginal product and wage (R = W >  WJ) -- refers to
values per efficiency  unit of labor. The employer determines the policy  and there is no reason for labor
redundancy to arise or last Note, however, that if the employer were suddenly not allowed to lay off
workers or lower the above-market wages,  these high wages might not bring about greater effort and
redundancy might occur. From a policy  standpoint it must be stressed that the efficiency  wage behavior
of firms,  while appealing conceptually,  is difficult  to identify  empirically.  Hence, while the phenomenon
may be important, it has proved difficult  to distinguish  it conclusively  from other types of labor market
behavior on the basis of observable variables. 4
3See e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1986) for examples of theoretical studies ir. this area.
4See Krueger and Summers (1988) for an example of an empirical investigation.4
Another  case when  a deviation from the  R  =  W.  rule is optimal in  the  free  market,
nonunionized setting is when firm-specific  human capital is important or when the cost  of labor
adjustment (i.e. the cost of recruiting,  screening, firing,  etc.) is significant.  In these circumstances the
firm may prefer temrararily  to retain employees whose marginal product becomes low (e.g. on the
downturn  of  the  b isiness cycle)  in  order  to  minimize the  cost  of  labor  adjustment. 5 The
"decasuahlation"  of t,ie port workers in modem ports is a good example of the growing  importance of
specific human capital in this transport mode and the corresponding desire of the employers to keep
a highly trained labor force. 6 For the purposes of this study, the most important feature of this case
is the fact that the temporary hoarding of low productivity labor is a  profit maximizing  (optimal)
phenomenon. However, from the policy  standpoint it may be useful to distinguish  whether the cost of
labor adjustment is the natural outcome of the functioning of the market (e.g. the cost of screening
applicants)  or the result of government regulation (e.g. legally  mandated severance pay). In the former
case labor hoarding is an optimal policy  of the firm and does not constitute an inefficient accumulation
of redundant  labor. In  the latter  case the excess labor is inefficient from the  profit maximizing
standpoint of the firm but, depending on the social welfare preferences, it may or may not be efficient
from the  society's perspective. Moreover, in  the  latter case a  change in  the  system (laws and
regulations) could easily eliminate the phenomenon.
A third optimal deviation from the R = W. rule may take place if workers are more risk averse
than firms. In this case it is optimal from the joint standpoint of the workers and firms to  agree
(perhaps implicitly)  on contracts that stabilize employment and wages in the face of fluctuations in
exogenous variables. The firms gain by being able to pay lower average wages than they would have
to pay otherwise to attract the workers. The risk averse workers are better off because they value
stability  and are willing  to trade off (uncertain) wages and employment for stability. 7 This optimal long
term relationship may of course have a short term manifestation of R  < W,. However, since both
workers  and firms prefer this framework,  the temporary hoarding of low  productivity  labor is again not
a sign of labor redundancy. In the context of SOEs, the interesting implication  of the implicit contract
model is the fact that SOEs, being government organizations, are arguably  completely risk neutral or
at least less risk averse than private firms.  Since the optimal degree of stabilization  of employment and
wages rises with the difference in risk aversion between the worker and the firm, the SOEs should
optimally  exhibit a greater extent of employment and wage stability  than otherwise similar private firms.
In this case it would be optimal for an SGE to operate with higher employment and lower wages than
an otherwise identical private firm.
The important social welfare implication  of competitive labor markets is that, while not always
equalizing th_ marginal product of labor and the wage, they tend to give rise to  privately Pareto
efficient outcomes in a generally competitive economy. However, these outcomes may or may not be
viewed as optimal from the social welfare standpoint. In particular, the outcomes may for instance be
viewed as producing a socially unacceptable income distribution. There may then be arguments for
government intervention or the legal sanctioning of certain countervailing forces such as unionization.
Most countries have indeed accepted the idea that "labor  is not an article of commerce"  and permitted
unionization as part of the economic system.
sThe firm  would also not hire a large number of workers on the upturn. See e.g. Nickeli (1986) for
a review of this case.
6See e.g. Harding (1990).
7See, for instance, Azariadis (1979) for a survey of the implicit contracts literature.5
The opportunity to form a union gives workers the power to bat gain collectively.  Collective
bargaining in tumn  introduces worker preferences explicitly  into the decisio: making framework at the
firm level. Hence, while in the earlier cases the employer unilateral,y set employment and pay (thus
avoiding labor redundancy), 8 in the unionized setting the employment-wage  outcome is the result of
strategic interaction between the t:mployer and the union. If unionization is a socially acceptable
economic activity,  the resulting pay-employment  practices are in a broad sense (tautologically)  optimal
from the social standpoint.
Inefficiency  would arise, however, if collective bargaining gave rise to firm-specific  outcomes
that were inconsistent with the pursuit of an overall social objective. This inefficiency  would be similar
in nature to those arising  in nonunion settings in the presence of imperfect markets. In what follows
we discuss this possibility  when the principal social goal is the maximization  of  GNP. 9
Analogously  to our earlier treatment, let W, be the market clearing (shadow) wage of a given
(efficiency)  unit of labor of a given skill in the economy. The objective of maximizing  GNP suggests
that  labor ought to be allocated across different uses so as to ensure the equality of the marginal
product of this unit of labor with W, everywhere (point A in Figure 1). Departures from this rule in
practice constitute departures from optimality because GNP could be increased by moving labor trom
less to more productive activities.
Unionization may  result in a variety of outcomes depicted in Figure 1'.  The figure captures labor
market outcomes in terms of the marginal revenue product curve of labor R (the short-run demand
curve for labor) and the iso-profit  curves giving  the wage-employment  combinations  that yield identical
levels  of profit to the firm.  From the conceptual standpoint the important iso-profit  curves are the zero
iso-profit  curve ir = 0, corresponding tk the minimum  acceptable profit, and the maximum  achievable
profit curve ir  = Max, where the limit on the profit level is imposed by the fact that the firm has to
pay at least the market wage W.  In a perfectly competitive system, the zero iso-profit curve vT = 0
would coincide with the maximum  acceptable profit curve ir  = Max and bargaining could not bring
about any deviation from the profit maximizing  (and the only feasible) outcome at point A. This
outcome would reflect the fact that perfect competition eliminates any room for bargaining.
Once (human capital or other) rents exist, the entire area between the W, line and the curve
corresponding to  some minimum acceptable profit (e.g.  7r =  0)  becomes the  "zone of  possible
bargains". The most traditional conceptual framework used for describing union behavior -- the so
called "union monopoly model" --  assumes that  the  union  raises the  wage above W,  but  that
management unilaterally adjusts employment. Hence if the union unilaterally (or even jointly with
management) sets the wage to W, employment would adjust to L -- the profit maximizing  level of
employment corresponding to  W -- and  no labor redundancy would be  present from  the firm's
standpoint.
In many unionized settings the union influences both wages and employment. The influence
on employment is either  direct through work rules, or indirect through the strategic interaction in
8 bis assumes that there is ro government intervention that would induce redundancy.
"the  maximization  of GNP is used because it is the theoretically and practically  most appealing
case. However, other maximands  can be incorporated into the above structure.6
repeated bargaining. 10 In general, if the union has some preference for employment, it is possible that
the wage-employment  outcome lies to the right of the margir.al  revenue product curve of labor ABB'
in Figure 1. The question is whether such an outcome is efficient or whether it implies the presence
of labor redundancy. As we show presently, in answering the quetion  one needs to distinguish three
concepts of efficiency: (a) efficiency  from the vantage point of the management, (b) efficiency from
the  perspective of the  management and union, acting as established bargaining partners,  and (c)
efficiency  from the social welfare standpoint.
From the  standpoint of an unconstrained profit maximizing  or cost minimizing firm, labor
redundancy arises when the marginal revenue product of labor falls short of the wage (labor cost per
worker). In terms of Figure 1, all outcomes to the right of the marginal  revenue product of labor curve
ABB' constitute cases where labor's marginal product falls short of the wage. The entire area to the
right of ABB' therefore represents labor redundancy from the profit maximizing  firm's standpoint. For
any given wage, the firm will maximize  profit (minimize cost) by reducing employment to the point of
equality between labor's marginal product and the wage.
As mentioned above, in a unionized firm, where the management and labor representatives
bargain over wages and employment, an outcome characterized by wages in excess of the marginal
product of labor may be Pareto efficient from the private standpoint of the bargainers.  The reason
for this is that gains from trade may exist if the union is willing  to trade wages for employment. This
can be  illustrated in terms of  Figure  1 by the fact that management is indifferent among points
B,C,D,E, and F, which all lie on the same iso-profit curve -- i.e., represent different wage employment
combinations that guarantee the firm the same level of profit.  The contract curve (the set of Pareto
efficient outcomes) for the managers and workers may then lie to the right of the marginal product
curve of labor (e.g., ACC', ADD', AEE', or AFF)  and the firmn  behaves as if maximizing  a positive
function of profit, wages and employment.
SOEs are not always  established to pursue strict profit maximization. (In the case of increasing
returns to scale, profits may  even be undesirable.) The performance of SOEs hence has to be assessed
with respect to the goals given to  them. Naturally, if SOEs were to maximize profit, all the above
(union and nonunion) employment and pay practices  would fully  apply to them. Assume,  however, that
the government pursues the relatively traditional and widely  accepted goal of maximizing  GNP. In that
case economic efficiency dictates that the  SOEs use the shadow price of labor (i.e. the  marginal
product that this type of labor generates elsewhere in the economy), rather than the actual wage, as
the  relevant yardstick for  setting employment. This  means that  labor redundancy occurs only at
employment levels at which labor's marginal  product starts falling short of the shadow (rather than the
aL(ual)  wage. In the usual case of a downward  sloping marginal product curve of labor and the actual
wage in excess  of the shadow  wage, this means that the social welfare (GNP maximizing)  criterion calls
for higher than profit maximizing level of employment, ceteris paribus. Illustrating with Figure  1,
suppose that the actual wage paid by the enterprise is W and the shadow wage is W,  The socially
efficient employment level is L*, while the privately  efficient (profit maximizing)  level is L. In general,
for wages above W¢,  the curve ABB' gives the profit maximizing  outcomes, whereas the vertical curve
ADD' depicts the socially efficient ones.
l°See Spinnewyn and Svejnar (1991) for a discussion  of the repeated bargaining case.7
An important point to stress is that the outcomes along the ADD' curve are all optimal in the
static context, when distribution does not affect productive efficiency,  but that the picture is less clea:
in  an  intertemnporal  setting. Outcomes tnat  occur above point A  imply that  workers in  a given
enterprise get above market clearing wages and that the resources used for paying the wage premium
are  not allocated for other  uses (e.g. productive investment or  luxury consumption of  the ruling
elite)." 1 This outcome is difficult to judge in general. If these resources were used instead for highly
productive investment, the growth of GNP and the social welfare (appropriately discounted) might be
higher. If the investment  were unprodii-tive or the resources were used for luxury  imports, the higher
wages paid to workers may be socially  preferable -- either on social grounds or on economic principles
because higher worker consumption may  stimulate demand for domestically  produced commodities.  In
sum, the asscssmcnt of the different wage outcomes in the dynamic  framework  needs to take additional
factors into account.
1.2  Implications for the Design of Redundancy Schemes
1.2.1 Determining the Level of Redundancy
As our discussion  indicates,  the private and social criteria of labor allocation are likely to differ
and  the assessment of mdnagers about the extent of labor redundancy may not coincide with the
society's evaluation of the seriousness of the ph-nomenon.  In particular, it is possible for profit
maximizing  (cost minimizing)  managers to estimate correctly that redundant labor is present at a given
wage, while the social (GNP maximizing)  criterion indicates that the firm uses too few workers. Li
terms of Figure 1, this paradoxical situation occurs in the area AB'D' -- an area which may be very
sizable if the marginal product curve of labor is highly  elastic.
Social  welfare maximization  is presumably  the criterion used by both the govern.nent authorities
supervising the SOEs and the international organizations. If GNP maximization approximates this
criterion, our discussion  indicates that shadow rather than actual wages ought to be used in assessing
the extent of labor redundancy. Operationally this means that within each skill  group redundant labor
is equal to the number of workers that would have to be removed in order to achieve full employment
and equalize the value of marginal product of labor across firms.  Wheteas this may be the general
optimal rule, there are several considerations that should be taken into account.
For example, in assessing  the marginal product of labor within the enterprise, it is important
to take into account not only the direct productivity  of the marginal  workers but also the effect of their
presence on  others. In particular, it is possible that the low productivity (effort) of the marginal
workers has a negative effect on effort of the inframarginal workers. Removing the underutilized
marginal workers could therefore have a positive effect on she morale and hence productivity  of the
remaining workers. If this negative externality in production is present, the overall productivity  of the
marginal workers may be significa  n' y negative, even if their direct (observed) productivity  is slightly
positive.  This negative morale problem has been particularly  serious in socialist economies but it is also
significant  problem in SOEs in general. A good example  is the Uruguay railway,  where the redundancy
scheme consisted of paying  surplus workers and ir  tructing them to stay away from the work premises.
t"Note that this point applies to all wages above the market clearing wage and not just to outcomes
on the vertical contract curve ADD'.8
Another  important  aspect  of  the  problem  relates  to  the  intertemporal  nature  of  the
optimization exercise and to  the possibilities for factor substitution. An optimizing firm takes into
account the relevant exogenous factors in determining its labor use. In the profit maximizing  case, for
instance, the exogenous factors are the output price, prices of inputs (including the wage if the firm
is a wage taker) and technology parameters. In the cost minimization case with exogenously fixed
output (e.g. by the government), output replaces output price in the set of relevant exogenous factors.
The important implication is thet while an efficient firm maintains the equality of labor's ma-a:nal
product to either the shadow or actual wage. factor proportions and possibly  input output ratios may
vary tremendously as the relevant exogenous factors change. Moreover, current decisions that are
consequential for the future operations of the firm, ought to take the expected intertemporal evolution
of the exogenous factors into account.
As we indicate below, many  govemment officiaLs.  consultants and World  Bank staff have telnded
to  rely on what has been called the "technical or ratio approach" in assessing the extent of labor
redundancy. The  approach focuses on  technical (productive) efficiency and  identifies redundancy
through the measurement of factor proportions (e.g. the capital-labor ratio) or the amount or value
of output an enterprise car, 5enerate from one or several of its inputs (e.g. output-labor or output-
capital ratios). The extent of labor redundancy is usually  identified by comparing the actual values of
these indicators with "experts' assessments"  of the optimal targets. The measure that is employed most
frequently in analyzing  labor redundancy is the output-labor ratio (average labor productivity),  although
the capital-labor ratio is also frequently used.
At  first sight, the  technical or  ratio  approach could be viewed as belonging to  the  cost
mimimization  paradigm because it sets the optimal employment levels in terms of output-related
indicators (e.g. miles or tons per worker). It is also appealing for public policy  because it yields  simple
and easily verifiable targets that can be used for loan conditionality  and labor force reduction plans.
However, by using simple indicators of this kind, the approach either ignores or treats only implicitly
the possibility  for optimal factor substitution and scale changes that should be undertaken in response
to changes in exogenous prices, technology and other relevant factors. 12 For example, when World
Bank staff and government officials  agree on conditions such as "the current tonnage per worker is X
and in the next five years it ought to be brought to X+Z" (a typical example), they either ignore or
make an implicit asumption  about the evolution of wages, prices of other inputs and technology (e.g.,
the speed  of electrification in  railways  or  containerization in ports). As our  discussion indicates,
ignoring these factors would in general be erroneous. Treating them implicitly  makes it difficult to
evaluate a given scheme and alter it if unforseen exogenous shocks (e.g. in oil price) occur. As we
indicate below, another drawback  of the engineering approach is that, from a more general (than GNP
maximization)  perspective, it does not constitute a bona fide cost-benefit calculation that takes into
account the costs of retraining, early retirement and relocation of employees within an intertempora:
framework. Finally, a  fundamental flaw of  the  engineering approach  is its  reliance on  average
"1It is occasionally argued that  the ratio approach  is justified because the  technology in  the
transport sector exhibits fixed proportions. This is rarely fully the case, especially  when one takes into
account all the ancillary activities of a given transport mode. However, even if the fLxed  proportions
assumption were tenable, it would merely imply fixed input-input (e.g. capital-labor) ratios. If the
production process displays nonconstant returns to scale in the relevant range, the leve! of output and
the output-labor ratio still depend on dg the exogenous variables.9
indicators, such as the average productivity of labor, to identify a marginal concept (low marginal
product of labor). The two concepts are usually  functionally  related but they rarely coincide.
The  conceptual  framework that  we outlined  above relies on  marginalist principles and
appropriate modifications are naturally required in cases of sizable (nonmarginal) adjustments. For
instance, if government ports dominate the port sector and a sizable reduction of stevedoring gangs
is considered as a policy  option, the wage currently earned by stevedores in the relatively  small private
sector is not the appropriate shadow  wage. Large-scale  layoffs in public ports would either depress the
private stevedoring wage or, if it is rigid downward, they would make it difficult . r the laid off
stevedores to find jobs at that wage. The appropriate shadow  wage hence has to take into account the
alternative jobs open to the laid off stevedores and the p,obabilities with which these jobs can be
obtained.
In general, the evaluation of the extent of labor redundancy in a GNP maximization  context
needs to be based on the current and expected shadow prices (wages) and technical parameters. The
basic  comparison in this framework  is between the marginal  value product of labor in the SOE and the
shadow  wage. In the simplest conceptual franework, the extent of labor redundancy is then given by
the number of workers whose marginal  productivity  falls  short of the shadow  wage. In a more complex
and realistic framework, allowance has to be made for management's expectations of future changes
in the relevant exogenuus variables and the correspond ng optimal hoarding of certain types of labor
within an intertemporal framework.
1.2.2  The Framework for Selecting an Optimal Redundancy Scheme
The basic principle for designing and selecting among different labor redundancy schemes is
that of social benefit-cost analysis.  In each case the government ought to select the scheme that has
the highest net social benefit. In terms of our conceptual framework, the selected scheme should be
the one that most increases social welfare, given the systemic and environmental constraints. Since
some schemes may be designed and implemented within a changing system, the relevant systemic
constraints are naturally those that are to prevail from the time of the implementation.
Within the GNP maxinization framework,  the basic social criterion for designing  the scheme
is the elimination of the difference between the marginal  revenue product of labor outside of the firm,
RI, and the marginal product of labor inside the firm R. Since labor redundancy implies that Re > R,
the optimal scheme would transfer labor from the enterprise to the higher productivity (alternative)
uses unfil R'  = R.
In those cases when the social welfare function incorporates other considerations, the R' - R
=  0 criterion may have to be extended. For instance, if the govemment needs to reduce a budget
deficit, this may be given weight in the benefit-cost analysis. The govemment may want to consider
the labor cost saved by the public sector as a result of the removal of redundant labor, LC, as well as
the amount of severance pay S that the public sector must pay the laid off workers. While in the strict
GNP  maximizing  cost-benefi'  calculus LC and S would be  treated  as transfers, in a  period of  a
budgetary stress these may be relevant factors in selecting redundancy schemes. Since in this context
LC is a benefit and S is a cost, the relevant principle is to select redundancy schemes on the basis of
their present value, defined as10
I  LCt  + R  - R  -Si  1)
(1  +r)  I
where r is the discount rate, i is an index  of time and I is the horizon of the scheme. The discount rate
reflects  how present  vs. future  oriented  the  govemment is,  and  I,  the  time  frame, reflects  a
government's concerns about political stability,  and budget constraints.
We have used the payback  period anid  internal rate of return variant of this formula to evaluate
specific redundancy schemes in the  case studies. The payback periods, calculated on  the basis of
equation (1), are reported in Table 5. Note that the formula in equation (1) is broader than the one
that  would be  used  if the  firm considered only its profit and  ignored the  economy-wide (GNP
maximization)  principle:
E  LC 1 - R 1 - S 1 (2)
(1  +  )' 
1.23  Monitoring and Adjustment of Schemes
The conceptual framework also implies that the implementation of the optimally designed
scheme should include monitoring as a standard fea ure that ensures that the scheme delivers the
intended benefits. This means continued changes in the system (e.g. personnel practices and possibly
laws) and in the elements of the scheme in order to reach the optimal pay and employment levels.
Exogenous factors will usually alter the initial targets and unforseen problems with the design of the
scheme will invariably  arise. These factors alter the level of redundancy and the original results of the
social benefit-cost analysis  underlying the scheme.
However, just as expectations of future developments play an important part in the design and
adjustment of an optimal scheme, one must also take into account the effect of ex post adjustments
of the redundancy scheme on agents' expectations and the possible derailment of an entire scheme.
As our review of various experiences reveals, if the possibility  of adjustment is likely to result in an
abusive change of the scheme by a particular interest group, this ought to be taken into account (as
a cost) in the ex ante benefit-cost calculation about the desirability of an adjustment of the given
scheme.
2. THE DETERMINANTS  OF THE REDUNDANCY  PROBLEM
2.1 Principal  Sources of Labor Redundancy
The problem of labor redundancy in state owned transport enterprises is difficult to forestall
and cure because it is created by numerous factors, more than one of which is frequently present. Most
causes can be classified  as arising from: (a) a decline in the demand for labor, (b) financial constraints,
and (c) government regulations and practices that increase employment for purely social reasons. See
Table  1 for a summary  of the principal sources for each case.11
2.1.1  Decline in Demand
The findings  from our case studies and from Galenson (1989), from which this section borrows
heavily,  indicate that the decline in the demand for labor in a particular enterprise arises primarily  from
a decline in the demand for the service due to competition, general economy-wide  recession, labor-
saving  technical progress and/or organizational  change. In some cases (e.g. Ghana) the optimal quantity
of labor demanded also falls as a result of a sizable rise in real wages over time.
The decline in demand for labor due to competition includes competition from the private
sector that provides a better service in the same or alternative mode of transportaticn. The bus sector
has  been  deregulated  in  several countries and  the  private  bus companies have in  many cases
mushroomed (e.g. Sri Lanka), taking business away from some of the public bus routes. Competition
from  the  rapidly  growing road  transportation  sector  has  displaced  the  demand  for  railway
transportation, especially  for passenger transport, in a large number of countries, including  Chile, Costa
Rica, Ghana and Yugoslavia.  In Brazil, the decline in demand is limited to passenger traffic as freight
traffic has been increasing substantially  over time. Costa Rica and Sudan provide particularly telling
examples. Costa Rica's railway  traffic dropped from about 1.7 million tons of cargo in 1975 to about
0.7 million tons a decade later as the country's road system developed and a competitive trucking
industry emerged. As a result, nearly all of the approximately  2,800 staff are estimated to be redundant,
as is most of the railway  operation itself. In Sudan, the railway  from Khartoum to Port Sudan has seen
its annual freight traffic decline from 3.5 million  to 0.6  million tons over fifteen years. Yet the labor
force of 33,000 has been retained.
In  some cases, such as Ghana,  Sri Lanka  and  Yugoslavia, a  persistent economic crisis
contributed to the decline in demand for the output of particular transportation SOEs. The overall
decline in economic activity  also reduced the shadow wage, however, and the impact of the recession
on the extent of labor redundancy is therefore difficult to determine.
Technological change in  the transport sector has invariably reduced the total  number of
laborers required. This has certainly been the principal cause of labor redundancy in the port sector
with the advent of containerization, as well as the new automated processes now used for loading and
unloading ships and maintaining ships and facilities. It has also been a principal cause of redundancy
in the railways.  The switch from steam to diesel locomotives  and the electrification  of lines has played
an important part in reducing the demand for operating and maintenance personnel in all the case
studies." 3 Technological change has also altered the optimal skill mix, a phenomenon that has been
especially pronounced in ports.
The decline in the  demand for labor can also arise from changes in  the  orgabizational
structure  of the enterprise. For example,  the merger of the individual  railways  into the federal railway
in Brazil meant  the  elimination of  many previously duplic&ted activities. Similarly, the  repeated
reorganizations  of the Yugoslav  railway  system  as well as the changes of the definition of an enterprise
brought about shifts in labor demand.
"The  introduction of diesel locomotives  has for instance eliminated the need tor the second man
in the cab. The introduction of both the diesel and electric locomotives  greatly reduced the need for
maintenance and repair staff.12
A sizable Increase in real wa es can also generate redundancy. In the case of Ghana's ia.  ty,
the cheap wage policy pursued during the colonial period was followed  by a sizable rise in real wages
in the post-independence years. Note, however, that in terms of Figure 1 a mere rise in wages along
the (socially optimal) vertical contract curve ADD' would not result in labor redundancy from the
sociai standpoint unless the rising wage bill forced the enterprise to bankruptcy. Redundancy would
occur, however, if the shadow wage W, = R'  also rose but less than the wage in the firm, or if the
marginal product curve of labor shifted leftward (a fall in demand). The social desirability of above
market wages from the intertemporal standpoint also needs to be taken into account.
Finally,  a decision to privatize can be a source of labor redundancy in that the private criterion
of efficiency  can require less labor.  In almost every case, the government is required to shed excess
labor before selling the enterprise.  The Sri Lankan Transit Board is a case in point.
2.1.2  Financial Constraints
While investment in a  labor-saving technology can lead to  labor redundancy, the  lack of
investment in existing capital can do so as well.  If an enterprise is financially unable to repair or
replace  its equipment, the same number of  employees who might once  have operated  the  firm
efficiently may  well become excessive.  The Ghana Omnibus Service  Authority is an extreme example.
Over the years, the lack of imported spare parts and new buses led to a situation where in 1988 the
staff to operating bus ratio reached 55:1. The management, believing this shortage of parts to  be
temporary, was reluctant to lay off staff. The situation in Ghana's other public bus companies (State
Transport Corporation and City Express Services) and in Sri Lanka's Transport Boards, while less
extreme, was analogous. In terms of our conceptual framework, the decline in availability  of other
inputs (e.g. capital) results in a leftward shift of labor's marginal product curve and a rise in labor
redundancy.
Labor redundancy also arises as budgetary stress induces a major decline in the purchase of
cooperating inputs. This is a widespread phenomenon in the public sector of developing countries in
general. Many  civil  service reforms, brought about by declining  budgets, have resulted in sharp cutbacks
in nonlabor inputs (e.g. fuel in the case of highway  maintenance) but only in limited or no reductions
in employment. The result in these situations has been a sharp decline in labor productivity.
2.1.3  Government Hiring and Firing Policies
Governments often use the public sector as a source of employment for social and political
reasons, especially  during periods of declining  demand. In our sample, politically  motivated hiring  was
detected in all countries except possibly  Mauritius. In many countries this general policy has been
formalized with decrees imposing hiring quotas on both the public and private sector. In many cases
these decrees increase employment beyond the levels desired by the manager, hence directly creating
redundancy from the private though, as we noted earlier, not necessarily the social standpoint. In
Kenya, for instance, a  presidential decree of  1978 simply directed the  private sector to  increase
employment by 10%.
Another extreme example  is the system  of permanent contracts (employment  guarantees) found
typically in socialist countries (Egypt and the former Soviet bloc countries) as well as many other
developing countries (e.g. Senegal and Ivory  Coast). Moreover, hiring in many  countries takes the form13
of mandated hiring of certain groups, usually those completing a particular level of schooling. In
Senegal, for example, the government, as the employer of last resort, used to hire automatically all
graduates of universities as well as of secondary and professional schools. In Yugoslavia,  the railways
had to train (and often retain) graduates in proportion to existing employees. However, a number of
countries -the Central African Republic, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Togo, among others -phased
out the promise of jobs in the face of shrinking public sector budgets.
In other cases, there is simply constant pressure on the directors of state owned enterprises
from presidential or ministerial levels to hire as many unemployed workers as possible. This was for
instance one source of excess labor in the bus and port sectors of Ghana and Sri Lanka, as well as in
the Chilean ports and railways  during the Allende period.
SOEs often provide certain goods or services in order to fulfill political or social objectives.  In
the  transport  sector, unprofitable routes  are  often retained  to  provide cheap  access for  certain
segments of the population. In virtually all the cases studied, we found that passenger fares were
subsidized  by the government and unprofitable passenger routes were often maintained. An especially
interesting example that was not in one of our case studies is the Pakistan Intemational Airlines. PIA
considers one of its foremost contributions to the national economy to be the provision of low cost air
services to inaccessible  and less developed regions of the country, while loosing an estimated Rs. 170
million (U.S. $10.6 million) on domestic routes in 1984/85. Whether or not such services are justified
and the employed workers redundant of course depends on their shadow price (i.e. the underlying
social welfare function). There  is no  doubt, however, that  in most cases that  we examined the
employees on the margin produced significantly  less than their marginal cost or shadow wage. 14
2.2  Factors Preventing Reductions in Employment  or Wages
Although exogenous factors such as declining  demand for labor may be the immediate cause
of labor redundancy, the inability  of the enterprise to adjust its labor force sustains the problem. The
failure to adjust employment to a socially  or privately efficient level can stem from a variety of causes.
Frequently, politically  or socially motivated laws (e.g. labor laws protecting workers from being fired)
and bureaucratic constraints (e.g. with respect to hiring) will  induce inefficiency  from both the private
and social standpoint. Trade unions and other workers' organizations often promote work rules of
various types in order to induce work safety and job security.  Sometimes employers  promote work rules
to  prevent  workers from  avoiding certain  tasks such  as demarcation  among different  types of
workers. 15 As is clear from our conceptual discussiun, some of the rules and constraints may be
efficient. However, from the standpoint of public policy it is important to  identify which ones are
operating and determine their private and social desirability.  Rules that make sense under one set of
conditions may be rendered obsolete by another, but laws,  custom or strong interest groups may delay
1'The subsidies  needed for keeping some of these firms operating are often hidden (e.g. exemption
from taxes or artificially low fuel prices). A given branch of the government (e.g. the supervisory
ministry)  may not even be aware of their true cost and hence be unable to judge whether the subsidies
divert users from more efficient alternatives.
'sIn the ports the so cailed "continuity  rule"  was for instance imposed by the employers to prevent
workers from abandoning a poorly paid or difficult  cargo  when a more attractive cargo arrived. See e.g.
Harding (1990).14
their revision.  To the extent that these practices interfere with the efficient allocation of labor in the
economy, they may reduce output and welfare. The two most salient examples of restrictive practices
are manning rules and constraints on labor mobility.
2.2.1  Manning  Ratios
Rules requiring a fixed number of workers for a  particular task are usually established in
collective bargaining agreements with respect to  a  particular technology, for which they may be
economically  appropriate. However, when new technologies are adopted, custom, or more commonly
a union desire to prevent unemployment of members,  sometimes result in the maintenance of the old
ratios even when they imply  very low marginal productivity  of labor. To the extent that the enterprise
is privately owned and the  agreement is voluntary, the outcome is privately, though not  socially,
efficient. In the case of an SOE, however, social efficiency  is the relevant criterion and the inefficiency
derived from this restrictive work practice ought to be the focus of public policy.
Examples of excessive  manning ratios can be found in all transport modes. In ports, the size
of the gangs that load and unload cargo, while originally  based on the number of men needed to
process a certain number of individual  crates or bags per unit of time, became excessive  in the context
of modem port  technology. While general cargo gangs range from around  15 to 35 workers, the
standard gang size under a container system normally ranges from 6 to 10. Under the manning rules,
workers are able to extract the rent arising from the introduction of new technology and the number
of workers paid frequently exceeds the  number actually doing the job.  In  some U.S. ports  the
nonworking  gang members have to be present in the port, thus having  zero marginal product. In other
U.S. cases, the idle gang members are able to hold other jobs and share their port and outside income
with those who perform the port work. In this latter case the idle port workers contribute a positive
marginal  product elsewhere in the economy and the manning ratios induce a redistribution of income
but not necessarily  misallocation  of labor in the economy. A variant of the latter case existed in Chile
in the 1970s as the entry of labor was restricted and licensed port workers rented their work permits
for half the wage to other workers.  The rent involved  was significant  enough that these latter workers,
called "half  chickens",  in turn rented the license to other workers,  the so called "quarter chickens".  With
the exception of Chile and recently Ghana, the ports examined in our case studies all display  a variety
of rent sharing and restrictive work practices (e.g. strict demarcation of hours of work and number of
shifts).
In extreme circumstances,  excessive  gang sizes can crowd the work place to the point that the
marginal product of labor becomes negative. For instance, after container cranes had been installed
in the port of Bombay,  22 workers continued to be employed per container crane on the quay, where
only 1 or 2 were needed. Similarly,  6 workers continued to work on the ship, where 1 could do the iob.
As Couper (1986) reports, productivity  in the port was below the average even for break bulk cargo -
- about 17 tons per gang-hour, compared to a normal 25 tons.
Examples of problems with obsolete manning ratios in the railways  include the difficulty  with
eliminating the  second  man  (fireman) in  the  cab when  railways switched from steam  to  diesel
locomotives  and the resistance to eliminating the guard when cabooses were replaced with rear-end15
marker  devices.  Collective  bargaining  agreements  often  provided  for  these  positions  to  be
maintained. 16
2.2.2  Geographical  and Organizational  Constraints
One  method  used by trade  unions to  protect  the jobs of  their  members is to  negotiate
geographic or organizational rules for allocation of work. An example is a rule requiring that any work
done within certain boundaries be carried out by union members. ln Costa Rica, the railway  unions
have been able to enforce a rule that workers on the Atlantic line cannot be replaced by or used to
replace workers on the Pacific line. In the United States the longshoreman have enhanced their job
security by securing the clause that within fifty miles of the port, cargo must be  handled by U.S.
longshoreman or a royalty must be paid (the "fifty  mile rule"). A similar rule existed in the United
Kingdom, although it was later  amended (Harding, 1990). Finally, in  the port  of Buenaventura,
Colombia, all work in the adjacent free zone is included in the port labor agreement.
2.2.3  Labor Legislation and Custom
Labor legislation and traditional employment  practices  can be an important cause of inflexibility
in labor markets. All the socialist economies as well as many diverse developing countries such as
Brazil, Ghana, India, Ivory Coast, Panama, Senegal, and Sudan have for long periods severely limited
the employer's right to fire workers.' 7 For instance, in Yugoslavia (as in other socialist countries)
workers were  until recently legally protected  against layoffs brought  about by variations in the
economic  performance of their enterprise. The only exception was in the case of enterprise bankruptcy
which was a rare event. In countries such as Brazil, Ghana, and Sri Lanka, the restriction on layoffs
was implicit. Layoffs were stipulated to  be a  permissible managerial action but  the socio-political
atmosphere was such that managers rarely entertained the idea of resorting to layoffs." 8
Among the countries not examined explicitly  in our case studies, Panama and Senegal have
exemplified the  most  highly regulated  labor  markets. Senegal's Labor  Code  of  1961, and  the
modifications adopted since then, for instance severely regulated all the major components of labor
market  operations.  The  Code  limited the  use  of  fxed  term  contracts  and  made  open-ended
(permanent) employment the prevalent form. Layoffs  of workers with open-ended contracts had to be
approved by a labor inspector, and his decisions could be appealed as far as the Supreme Court.
Layoffs could only be justified by serious misconduct  on the part of the worker or difficulties  brought
16In the airline industry, there were similar problems encountered  as companies attempted to
eliminate the third man in the cockpit with the introduction of modern navigational and video display
technology.
171n the French speaking developing countries, some of these practices can be traced to the Labor
Codes originating in the French Overseas Labor Code. Indeed, in France itself it was not until reforms
initiated by Prime Minister Chirac in the early 1980s that employers could lay off workers without
securing prior authorization from the Labor Ministry.
'8ln Ghana there have also been special regulatory restrictions imposed on the SOEs. For instance,
the dismissal  of five or more workers from SOEs must be authorized by the Ministry of Labor, except
when criminal offense can be proven.16
about by an act of nature (such as a fire). An economy-wide  recession was not adequate justification
(see e.g. Terreil and Svejnar, 1989).19  Other interesting examples of government restrictions include
India, where firms with more than 100 workers cannot lay off workers without the permission of the
local government, and the Sudan, where termination of employment used to require a Presidential
decree.2A
2.3 Factors Leading to a Decision to Reduce Excess Labor
Given the desire of govemments to build a political base in view of significant  and often rising
urban unemployment,  it is not surprising  that labor redundancy is usually  a persistent problem. The task
of cutting back the number of workers in the public sector is made all the more difficult  when those
who stand to lose are represented by strong unions and can potentially bring about political upheavals.
As a  result, developing country governments frequently take decisive actions only when they find
themselves in the position to do little else.
The evidence from a number of countries indicates that the most important catalysts in the
decision to tackle the problem of redundant labor are the poor financial performance of the SOEs,
unsustainable government budget deficits, the advent of a new government, public outcry about the
rents reaped by certain groups, and loan conditionality  imposed by foreign lenders.
When governments can no longer continue sustaining losses of the SOEs, they become much
more willing  to take the painful decisions to improve their efficiency.  The govemments usually reach
this situation after an extended period of losses  by the SOE sector and government budgetary deficits.
The reduction of variable costs becomes an important target  of the  SOE reform and  labor cost
represents a sizable share in this category.
As can be seen from the cases of presidents Pinochet in Chile, Premadasa in Sri Lanka,
Rawlins in Ghana, and Castelo Branco in Brazil, the decision to undertake a reform of SOEs is often
made by a new government (see also Table 1). Of course, the downfall  of the previous  government may
be intimately  connected to these economic problems and the new government may  be brought in with
a  mandate to  solve them. Yet,  a new government is not  always able to  deal with the  problem
immediately  in all sectors. For example,  while the Pinochet administration rapidly  started the process
of reduction of personnel in the public sector, it took almost six years before it tackled the ports. By
then it had obtained significant  public support by informing the public about the sizable rents that the
private port workers were reaping through the system of permits (licenses) and the negative effect that
the system presumably had on the functioning of the entire Chilean economy.
Interestingly, as  can be  seen  from  Table  1, a  conservative political orientation  of  the
govemment does not seem to be a necessary  condition for taking decisive  steps to reduce the size of
SOEs in the transportation sector. The socialist govemment in Mauritius laid off 2,609 people (66%
of the port workers) in one year. Some 3,500 port workers were induced to leave voluntarily  under a
social-democratic  government in Sri Lanka in 1972 and the socialist govemment of Yugoslavia  closed
"The  restrictions in C6te d'Ivoire have been similar though perhaps not as severe as in Senegal.
20The  procedures were eased somewhat in 1983  when the govemment permitted a discretionary
discharge  of workers  who  were absent for three consecutive  weeks.17
down about 25% of total route-km of its railways  between 1960  and 1980. However, overall evidence
around the world suggests that conservative (market-oriented) governments are more prone to be
concerned about the financial performance of the public sector and hence take action to eliminate
labor redundancy.
Of course, as mentioned earlier, many governments have since the late  1970s had to  take
resolute actions as credit became tighter and public debts reached unsustainable levels. This general
climate has also been a factor in inducing  governments that otherwise might not have taken action to
do so, even in times when the labor market is generally depressed (e.g. Sri Lanka). In Chile, the port
restructuring scheme was carried out in spite of the downturn in the economy in the two years that
followed  its introduction. In this case, the negative  economic environment may have in fact helped the
success of the scheme by forcing the workers to  return to  the port earlier than the;y  'ht  have
otherwise.
In many cases, an important impetus for undertaking background studies, restructuring SOEs,
and reducing redundant labor was the position of the World Bank and other lending institutions. In
virtually all the  cases  we studied,  World Bank  technical  assistance or  loan  conditionality was
instrumental in focusing the  attention  of the  government on  the  issue of  labor redundancy and
formulating specific policies to  deal with the  problem. While in some cases, such as Ghana  and
Yugoslavia,  this phenomenon is relatively  recent, in others (e.g. Brazil) it dates back to the 1950s  and
1960s.
3.  FINDINGS ON THE EXTENT OF REDUNDANCY,  POLICIES AND SCHEMES
As we have indicated in Part 1, the identification of a socially  optimal employment level in a
given SOE is a prerequisite for arriving at an appropriate estimate of the extent of labor redundancy.
The design of optimal redundancy policies and specific schemes in turn needs to be based on this
estimate as well as assessments  of the social costs and benefits of labor adjustment. In this section we
review the main approaches that have been used to estimate the extent of labor redundancy and to
design policies and redundancy schemes.
In order to provide a comparative analysis,  we have collected data in the six countries covered
by our project on a) the methods used to identify the extent of labor redundancy; b) findings on the
extent of redundancy; c) the nature of the policies and redundancy  schemes; and d) the compensation
packages available for redundant workers. To make our findings as representative as possible, our
discussion is based on these data as well as on information about practices in other countries.
3.1 Methods Used to Identify  the Extent of Labor  Redundancy
In the extreme cases when all workers are clearly redundant, the estimation of the extent of
redundancy is naturally straightforward. These clear cut situations arise for instance when a given
section of a transport mode is to  be closed down (e.g. the closure of uneconomic railway lines in
Yugoslavia)  or when all workers are to be replaced by a new mechanical process (e.g. in the Mauritius
Bulk Sugar Terminal).18
In  most other  cases the situation is not  as straight forward. There  is usually a variety of
perceptions about the extent and location of redundant labor within an enterprise and political as well
as technical factors are frequently brought to bear on the economic decision.  However, as mentioned
earlier, when quantifying the overall extent of labor redundancy,  the most common  approach has been
the "engineering approach", which focuses on technical (productive) efficiency as proxied by output-
input  (e.g. output-labor),  input-input (e.g. capital-labor) or factor cost to  total  cost  ratios.  The
measures identify redundancy by examining  the quantity or value of output an enterprise can generate
from one or several of its inputs and by examining  its factor proportions. It ignores economic aspects
such as the possibility  for factor substitution and actual as well as shadow prices.
In the railway  sector one of the most common measures used is the number of traffic units (i.e.
the  number  of passenger  kilometers plus the  number of  freight ton  kilometers) per  employee.
According to railway specialists, a reasonable yardstick currently used for railway efficiency  is about
5(,000-600,000 traffic units per employee in pure freight transport and about 200,000-250,000  traffic
units per employee in pure passenger transport. The exact numbers of course differ over time and
across countries. Nevertheless, the measure was used in all the railways  we examined - Brazil, Chile,
Ghana, and Yugoslavia. Brazil was the only country where  ither criteria also received comparable
weight. In Chile, the director of the railway used this output/labor ratio in addition to capital/labor
ratios in 1973 to conclude that a 30% across the board reduction in personnel would not affect the
functioning of the railway. In Ghana, the value of this ratio in the Cameroon and other  regional
railways  served as a yardstick  for the railway's  employment  and redundancy policies  as well as for World
Bank conditionality.  In the Yugoslav railways,  the so called systematization  exercise based on this ratio
underlay the careful plan for labor force reduction in the  1980s. Evidence from other  countries
indicates that the use of this measure is indeed widespread.
In the bus sector, the number of employees per operating bus (a labor-capital ratio) is the
single most important measure used to determine the level of redundancy.  The difference between the
actual ratio (13.1) and the optimal ratio of 6.5 employees per operating bus was used as the rule of
thumb to determine the level of redundancy in the Sri Lanka Transport boards. Similarly,  in Ghana's
public bus companies, external consultants, enterprise  managers and  the supervisory government
agencies all used this criterion to set employment  targets for the companies. The number of employees
per bus exceeded 10 in all of Ghana's public bus companies during the mid 1980s  and in some of the
companies it was in excess of 20. The reduction of labor in accordance with this indicator became a
primary concern. The optimal target of 5 employees per bus was set by the director of Ghana's City
Express  Services  after observing English  and Indian public and private bus companies. Other Ghanaian
companies used consultant's opinions and other sources of practical information to establish similar
target values of this indicator.
In  the port  sector, the perceived "best practice" ratio of  the number of workers per ton
transported depends on whether the transport is in  the form of conventional (or bulk) cargo or
containerized unit.  As we noted earlier, the former is often seen as requiring gangs of 15-35 men,
while in efficient ports the latter is processed with gangs of only of 6-10 individuals.  The Mauritius
Marine Authority estimates it has some labor redundancy based on the optimal gang size for container
traffic.
Overall, it must be stressed that in most cases that we examined,  the directors of SOEs, external
consultants and government officials also considered other quantitative and qualitative measures to
assess the extent of labor redundancy. Given the importancs of financial constraints, one frequently19
consulted indicator was the ra*:o  of labor cost to total cost. (Like the labor-output ratio, it is a partial
indicator; however it is a broader measure because it considers both relative quantities and prices.)
Almost invariably,  enterprise directors consulted the heads of the divisions  to determine the number
of people needed by skill level and organizational  unit. In many cases, the SOEs also relied on reports
of external consultants. However, the recommendations of the divisional chiefs and consultants were
frequently not clearly substantiated or relied on the very same ratio indicators. Hence the basis for
most estimates of labor redundancy  has been the "technical ratio approach", adjusted by financial and
political considerations.
The question that naturally arises is how different these estimates are from those that would
be  obtained using the social welfare approach. While we address this question below, it is worth
pointing out that in the cases that we examined no explicit social welfare approach was in fact used.
3.2 Findings on the Extent of Labor  Redundancy
Given that systemic features of most countries impose significant  costs on rapid and sizable
labor adjustment, estimates of labor redundancy usually  exceed the number of people laid off in the
first major waves of retrenchment. In the case of the recent redundancy schemes, it is possible to
obtain data on both the estimated excess labor and the layoffs.  In the more historical case studies, it
was  often impossible  to distinguish  clearly  between the estimated extent of redundancy and the number
of people retrenched. In these circumstances the reliable data were those related to layoffs.
Evidence from our case studies, summarized in Table 2, as well as comparative data collected
by Galenson  (1989, pp. 82-83) indicate  that  the  official estimates of  the  absolute and  relative
magnitudes  of labor redundancy  in the transport sector are very large. Brazil's federal railway  (RFFSA)
for instance estimated that it inherited "tremendously  excessive"  staff when it was created as a merger
of 18 railways  in 1957. In accord with the country's emphasis on minimizing  the social cost of labor
dislocations, RFFSA adopted a gradual approach (the so called policy of minimum trauma) toward
eliminating  redundant labor. As a result, despite significant  growth in traffic, RFFSA gradually reduced
employment by 30% between 1964 and 1975, and by 60% between 1965  and 1988.
In Chile, the port authority (EMPORCHI) carried out one of the most ambitious and rapid
layoff schemes in  the  world. EMPORCHI  undertook  a  detailed  functional analysis across  all
organizational units in view of the legally permitted entry of private companies into its previously
protected activities, and laid off 56% of its labor force in 1981.  The extent of labor redundancy in the
private  (stevedoring) operations  of  the  Chilean ports  could not  be  estimated, 21 but  the  1981
elimination of all restrictive practices associated with the pre-existing  closed shop resulted in a sizable
increase in various indicators of port efficiency.  Finally,  the Chilean railway  enterprise (EFE) reduced
its staff by a full 50% (13,000)  in the 1975-79  period and analysts  subsequently  believed that EFE still
employed some excess staff.
21Since stevedores are usually  employed by many companies and organized by a number of trade
unions, it is difficult  to measure employment and labor redundancy in this segment of port operations
(see also Harding, 1990).20
Ghana  Railway Corporation (GRC)  accepted a  consulting firm's estimate  of  28% labor
redundancy in 1978. After reducing its staff by 30% between 1978 and 1986, GRC agreed with the
World Bank to reduce employment by another 18% between 1987 and 1992.  By 1990 the railway  had
already succeeded in reducing its labor force by 15%. In Ghana's public bus sector, labor redundancy
was estimated at 54% in the State Transport Corporation in 1987 and 71% in the City  Express Services
in 1988-89.  Both companies started layoffs  in 1989,  and by the middle of 1990, the former had laid off
15% and the latter 35% of their respective employees. Ghana  Ports and Harbour Authority was
generally  aware of its historically  excessive  labor force; employment  was decreased without any specific
goal by 20% between January  1986 and July  1989. However, in the  meantime, the  management
reviewed all port operations and, with the aid of the same consulting firm as was used in the railway,
arrived at an estimated 50-55% labor redundancy in 1989. After  negotiations with the union and
government, management laid off 32% of the labor force in one month (August, 1989), and another
40% by the end of 1989.
In Mauritius, the creation of the new sugar terminal made 87% or 2,609 of the port workers
redundant.  Determining the number of workers was fairly  straightforward since it was all the workers
that  loaded bags of sugar.  However, selecting the  people  who would  be  laid off was not  so
straightforward since a portion of the work force only unloaded sugar part of the time.
The  World Bank staff estimated that  about 40% or  20,000 employees in  the  Sri Lanka
Transport Board were redundant at the end of 1989. Here the ratio of employees to the existing  stock
of operating  buses was used as the  method to  determine  the  number of  redundant  employees.
However, toward the end of 1990  the government was investing  in rebuilding the buses that were out-
of-service, which of course revises the estimate of redundancy.
In Yugoslavia,  the railways  reduced their labor force by 12% from 1964 to  1973 as market-
oriented reforms were introduced, uneconomic lines  were closed and the railways  switched from steam
to diesel locomotives.  For a variety of political and institutional reasons employment increased back
to the earlier level in the 1970s  and 1980s.  The official  April 1990  estimate put labor redundancy in
the Yugoslav  railways  at 11% and the 1989-93  loan agreement with the World Bank envisions a 1.5-2%
annual reduction in the labor force.
If uneconomic lines were closed in Costa Rica, it has been estimated that 96% of the railway
employees would become redundant.  This estimate  assumes that  these lines can not  be  made
profitable, which the Costa Rican railway managers are currently researching.
Clearly, the magnitude of the problem is varied and generally significant.  The solutions have
teen  also varied and had diverse impacts on efficiency,  government budgets and individual  as well as
social welfare.
3.3  Nature of the Policies and Redundancy Schemes
As can be seen  from the summary indicators in Tables 2 and 3, the redundancy schemes
examined in our study vary considerably  in term of the groups or individuals  who designed the scheme,
the speed of labor force adjustment, the reliance on voluntary vs. involuntary separation, and other
aspects of implementation.21
33.1  The Decision Making Process
As far as the design of the scheme is concerned, on one extreme is the Chilean case, where the
policies and schemes were formulated at the very top by members of the presidential economic team
and carried out by enterprise directors who cooperated with the team. In the case of the Chilean
railway, there was virtually no involvement of the higher-level managerial staff. Each manager was
handed a list of names of people that the director general proposed for layoffs  and the managers  were
only given the power to strike off a certain number of names. The situation was similar in the Chilean
port  authority except that  managers were involved in the information gathering stage. To induce
truthful revelation of labor redundancy, the managers' own job security depended on the quality of
information they provided.  This information  was  evaluated by the personnel director's team with a visit
to  each  workshop. The  Brazilian experience falls near  this  extreme. Their  railway enterprise
management  autonomously designed the  schemes within a  broad  policy outline  and  budgetary
constraint imposed by the government.
Yugoslavia represents another extreme, where the railway workers were involved from the
decision on line closures to the design of employment generating projects for redundant employees.
T.e  other principal co-decision makers were ma..agers and government officials.
Numerous intermediate cases span these extremes. Most relied on "tripartite committees",
comprised  of government, employers and the trade unions, to negotiate the terms of the scheme. This
was the case for instance in Ghana and Mauritius. Moreover, the role of outside organizations, such
as the World Bank, was in many cases very significant.
33.2  Voluntary vs. Involuntary Nature and Time Frame
The redundancy schemes also vary widely  in terms of their voluntary vs. involuntary nature and
their time frame. On one extreme is what can be called the voluntary-attrition slow-time-frame  model.
The success of this model relies on factors such as compliance with restricted hiring, alternative sources
of employment in the economy, an older labor force in the enterprise, growing  output demand, and
the ability  of the government to sustain (presumably lower) losses over a longer period of time. The
model was used in the Brazilian railways,  where the railway  staff was reduced by 60% over a period
of two decades, as well as in the Yugoslav railways,  where the reductions were more moderate. As
noted by Havlicek (1988), this is the approach used most frequently in the more developed countries.
While the voluntary-attrition  slow-time-frame  approach has been successful  in many  countries,
it can be a failure if the government's resolve to  implement the scheme is weak. This was clearly
demonstrated in Sri Lanka following the 1982-1986  period of gradual labor force reduction in the
Transport Boards. The scheme was not fully accepted by all tne parties and, as soon as the centrally
imposed restrictions on hiring were removed, employment rose back to the original levels.
At the other extreme is the involuntary-layoff  rapid-time-frame model, which was used in the
Chilean railway and port authority, Ghana's ports and buses and in the main port of Mauritius. The
Chilean, Ghanaian and Mauritius cases indicate that this scheme can be  implemented in extreme
political  environments (e.g. a socialist government and a military  dictatorship). In all the cases the cause
for the drastic nature of the scheme was the alarm about the perceived harm to the economy at large.
These schemes tend to be successful in terms of eliminating the redundancy problem, but they tend22
to have high social and political costs. Moreover, there is the potential danger that the scheme can
overshoot by eliminating too many workers, given the future development of exogenous factors. It is
possible that the gradual rise of employment  and redundant labor in Yugoslav  railwavs  aftcr the closure
of noneconomic lines was in part motivated by the perception that some closures represented an
overshooting.
The intermediate schemes rely on a variety of measures tnat are deemed appropriate for the
specific systemic and environmental setups. These in lude  the modification of existihig  collective
bargaining  agreements (e.g. in Colombian  ports), the replacement of existing  agreements by others with
a possible compensation for the conceding party (e.g. Australian as well as IJ.S. East and West Coast
port agreements), and the government-ordered change of existing  institutions (e.g. in Spanish ports).'
3.3.3  Retirement
Strict enforcement of the retirement age alone or  in combination with a reduction of the
mandatory retirement age were effective measures in Brazil and Yugoslavia  but they have proved to
be impractical  in countries with a relatively  young age structure (e.g. Senegal).  The measure is  generally
useful as an element of long term programs. Voluntary early retirement is another option used (e.g.
in Ghana's railway,  Sri Lanka's public bus company and Singapore's port). The principal drawback of
this method is that it usually results in a suboptimal skill mix unless restrictions are imposed on the
early retirement option of employees in specific  groups. Moreover, both methods can result in the loss
of the most productive workers.
3.3.4  Redeployment
Redeployment of workers to other government or private organizations has been used as a
means of reducing excess labor in a number of instances. The Brazilian railways  used this method in
some periods  and  the  pre-1990 Yugoslav approach was based  almost entirely on  this  principle.
Similarly,  the Uruguayan and Costa Rican governments  have promised the railway  workers that no one
would be laid off and they have taken extensive measures to place these workers elsewhere in. the
government.
Redeployment is a procedure that is appealing  in systems  that place high emphasis on workers'
employment (but not necessarily  job) security. From the standpoint of the SOE that tries to redeploy
its workers, the procedure is viable only if other employers are willing  to hire. In case of government
organizations, this usually means that they must not be suffering from a budget squeeze. From the
social welfare standpoint, redeployment to  other  government organizations makes sense if  they
themselves  do not suffer from labor redundancy and/or if there is a general hiring freeze in the public
sector. Finally, a practical problem of this method is that it makes it difficult to achieve optimal skill
matching.
22See  Harding (1990) for more details.23
3.3.5  Restrktions  on Hiring
These restrictions are frequently used as complements to other employment policies aimed at
reducing redundant labor. They range from total hiring freezes to limited hiring of certain groups (e.g.
locomotive drivers or maintenance workers). The principal advantage of hiring restrictions lies in
minimizing  the negative impact of labor adjustment on worker-insiders and in preventing excessive
hiring in SOEs that operate under soft budget constraints. The  1980s experience in the Sri Lanka
Transport Board, where the benefits derived from hiring freezes one year were completely nullified
in the following  year, is a case in point. It indicates that for effective reductions in force to take place,
these restrictions may have to be in place for several years.
As the Brazilian experience demonstrates, however, the negative aspect of such a long term
policy  is that enterprise performance may  suffer due to inadequate replacement of workers with crucial
skills.  This suggests  that the optimal period during which the government should impose  a hiring freeze
depends on  the starting conditions, the optimal length increasing with the softness of enterprise
budgets, the desire to protect insiders and the ability  of the enterprise to staff adequately its principal
activities.
3.3.6  Training
Surprisingly,  training was rarely used on a large scale as a means to alleviate the redundancy
problem. Where it was used -- Brazilian and Yugoslav railways  and Sri Lankan ports -- it has proved
to be a very effective method for dealing with labor redundancy brought about by the introduction of
new technology.  The Sri Lankan Port Authority created a Training Institute which has contributed
to both increased port efficiency  and reduction in the number of redundant unskilled employees. In
Yugoslavia, the socialist system guaranteed workers employment but  not job security. As a result,
rotation and redeployment were standard features of the system and the socially owned enterprises
provided the  necessary retraining. In  Ghana, retraining for redeployment was supposed to  be an
important element of the redundancy program but it was never implemented on a large scale.
The lack of training at the firm level often reflects the costs and benefits of training relative
to other procedures. The Chilean railway for instance had in-house training facilities but, given the
extent of redundancy, the government philosophy  and the cost of layoffs to the firm, the railway  found
it more efficient to rely on layoffs as a means of solving its labor redundancy problem. Furthermore,
in certain sectors (e.g. ports) technological  change often results in far lower need for labor and shifts
existing  demand to different skills. Retraining costs would often be prohibitive or retraining may be
simply  impossible,  given the abilities of the existing  labor force. The Ghanaian situation is an example
of these problems
3.3.7  Reduction  of Restrctive  Work Practices
Reduction  in work rules is usually an important component of labor redundancy schemes
designed in highly restrictive environments, especially the  ports. However, politically  this is a very
difficult  issue because the elimination of work rules usually  alters significantly  the bargaining outvcme
between the workers and the enterprise. Port activities are for instance often characterized by rents
and trade unions have historically  secured a share of these rents through the negotiated wages and24
restrictive work (employment) practices, such as large gang sizes, limited number of short shifts and
highly paid overtime.23  In terms of our conceptual framework, these voluntary bargaining agreements
are frequently socially inefficient but they may  be Pareto efficient from the standpoint of the workers
and  management. Moreover,  if  these  agreements are  concluded between  private  (stevedoring)
enterprises and  trade unions, the society is frequently hesitant to  impinge on a voluntary private
contract.
One  extreme course of action is exemplified by the case of the private operations in the
Chilean ports, where the government eliminated  all work rules in 1981.  After unsuccessful  negotiations
with  the  unions the  government  forcefully "bought the  book" of work  rules. The  government
unilaterally abolished all restrictive practices based on worker registration cards (licenses). In return,
it offered workers who turned in their cards a compensation that averaged US$ 19,084  per worker and
ranged from $10,000 to $ 200,000.24 This action was highly controversial both  within Chile and
internationally.  It constituted an attempt by the economically  liberal government to raise port efficiency
(and hence improve social welfaie), while compensating  the party whose private economic  contract it
violated in the process. The impact  on the workers  was hard to assess as they received  a relatively large
initial lump sum payment but by all accounts suffered a lower earnings stream for the remainder of
their working life. Efficiency  in port operations has increased tremendously with flexibility  to hire as
needed.
The case of Mauritius presents another extreme, with the government making an agreement
with the  unions that  there  would be  no change in the work rules after the  agreed upon layoffs
connected with the new Bulk Sugar Terminal. Since then, the Mauritius Marine Authority and the
Cargo Handling Corporation have been struggling  to maintain an efficient operation with restrictive
work practices including no double shifts, obsolete gang sizes and restrictions on mobility of gangs
between ships. They have been constantly negotiating  with the unions to replace these inefficient work
practices with new agreements.
Yugoslav  socialism  offered workers employment  security but eliminated work rules and claims
on specific jobs. As in the case of large Japanese firms, this system limited involuntary interfirm and
interregional labor mobility but enhanced intrarirm labor flexibility.
Reforming work rules may be the most effective way of gaining flexibility  in the labor market.
In many instances, this can considerably  increase the productivity  of existing staff without loss of jobs.
Strategically,  it appears that the best time to obtain concessions on restrictive work practices is during
the downturn in economic activity.  The unions tend to be willing  to forego these practices if they are
able to  preserve jobs. The employer can then  reduce redundant  labor by not  hiring during the
economic upturn.
23For  a review  of restrictive work practices in ports and railways  see Harding (1990) and Beshers
(1991), respectively.
2'These figures were provided by the Camara Maritima  de Chile. CEPAL (1990) gives a somewhat
lower but still sizable average compensation figure of US$ 12,800.25
33.8  Prlvatization
Selling off the enterprise to workers (as in the case of the Sri Lankan Transport Boards), or
to  others  in the  private sector, is a  possible method of  reducing redundant  labor in  the  public
transportation sector. There have been several cases of privatization  of the airlines  which seem to have
been effective. Discussion  is currently taking place in some countries (e.g. Argentina and Chile) about
privatizing  segments of the railways. However, because of its relatively  small capital requirements, the
bus sector is probably the easiest sector to privatize, especially if it is sold to the workers. Given the
experience of the Sri Lanka Transport Boards, privatization  of the bus sector may be the best way to
manage public sector redundancy there.  However, before an enterprise can be sold, the redundancy
problem must be solved.  Hence, privatization does not mean that the problem can be avoided, only
that once so'ved (and the enterprise is sold), it need not be a concern of the government in the future.
T'he success of the privatization approach of course hinges on the ability  of the private firm to
avoid some of the factors (e.g. government regulations or union agreements) that prevent the SOE
from reducing redundant labor. The experience with privatization  in the port of Bangkok indicates  that
this private sector advantage is not always  easy to obtain.
A partial solution can be to subcontract various activities,  such as maintenance, to the private
sector.  Ihis helped reduce labor costs in the Chilean rai!-  ways  as well as in Ghana's ports and in Ghana
Highway Authority. Finally, opening up formerly exclusively  public activities to the  private sector
competition (as for instance in the case of the Chilean onshore port activities and the shed work at
the port of Manila) is a form of privatization  that can both worsen the problem of excess labor in the
government organization and hopefully contribute to its solution.
3.4  The Compensation Package
As is evident from Table 4, all the schemes we analyzed, whether voluntary or involuntary,
offered some compensation to the affected employees.  The form of compensation varied from case to
case, with the main elements being special compensation pay, severance pay, special loans for laid off
employees, and pension benefits or provident funds (whichever  was applicable). In all of the countries
under study laws were already established on proceedures and amounts of compensation. Moreover,
except for Brazil which had an unemployment  compensation fund and a social security system in place
at the time, there were essentially  no other "safety  nets" legally  provided by the government.
The size of the compensation varied tremendously, ranging from one-half of a month's salary
per year of service with a maximum  of 7.5 months (the port workers in Sri Lanka in  1980) to 3-6
months of pay per year of service (as was promised but not delivered to Ghana's public bus service
workers). As mentioned above, the on-ship port workers in Chile received considerable  severance pay
for turning in their registration cards and they still retained the right to seek  work in  the ports
afterward.  Those that were eligible for pension received both the pension and the severance pay.
29The  size of the package is not clearly influenced by the philosophy  of the government in power.
If anything, there may be a negative correlation between the orientation of the government toward
labor and the size of the compensation,  as seen from comparing the compensation of workers in Chile
(in 1981)  vs.  Mauritius (in 1980)  and Sri Lanka (in 1972).  One possible  explanation is that economically26
However, in most cases the amount of the pension actually received was quite small relative to total
earnings.
From the point of view of the enterprise and government, all of the compensation packages,
except the Ghanaian ones, were financially  sound. Where it was possible to calculate the payback
period, we found it ranged from 4 months to 4.7 years. The compensation package offered by the
Ghanaian government also has a payback period of only 1 to 5 years but the cost of the scheme is
clearly beyond the current cash flow of the SOEs and will require credit from the intemational donor
community  if it is to be carried out.  The evidence from other countries also suggests  that the savings
outweighed the costs of the schemes in a relatively  short time. The problem therefore does not appear
to be  the net benefit of the schemes but the lack of immediately available funds to carry out  the
schemes.
From the perspective of the employee, the evidence in our case studies indicates that the
compensation payment is often spent rapidly without any visible  long term benefits. In cases where the
compensation is significant,  future compensation schemes should consider providing  counselling and
structuring the payments in such a way as to enable the worker to make best use of the money.  In
cases of individuals that are highly risk averse and not entrepreneurial, the best method might be
compensation in  regular installments over extended  period of  time, together  with assistance on
investment of the funds (as the World Bank is for instance currently doing in the Central African
Re'ublic  in a smal loan program). The installment method would make it easier for the government
to meet the payments but the scheme may not be viable in countries with high inflation or where the
government is not widely  trusted. Entrepreneurial workers are likely to be better off receiving a lump
sum payment together with business information and potentially training.
4. EVALUATION  AND LESSONS FOR POLICY
The main results of our investigation suggest that labor redundancy can be  a very severe
problem and that redundancy schemes tend to have a high rate of return (short payback period). The
case studies that we undertook also indicate that redundancy is not always an easy concept to grasp
and operationalize. The extent of labor redundancy can therefore be disputable and the design and
implementation of redundancy  schemes  is often controversial.  In this part we evaluate the main findings
of our research and draw policy  conclusions.
4.1  The Main Findings
4.1.1  The Severity  of the Probkm
Our principal factual finding is that state owned transportation enterprises frequently face a
major labor redundancy problem. The roots of the problem are in some respects analogous to those
liberal governments tend  to  have greater  respect  for  property rights and  feel  more obliged to
compensate the workers for the elimination of their economic rents.27
found  in  the  public sector  in general  (protracted  economic crisis, government hiring and firing
practices, lack of complementary inputs due to financial constraints, restrictive labor legislation,  etc.).
However, many are also sector specific,  such as declining demand due to competition or technological
change, restrictive work practices and organizationa! constraints.
In the six  countries that we studied intensively,  the extent of estimated redundancy  varied from
11% to 100% of the labor force. While 100% redundancy usually arises only before plant closing,26
our general finding is that 20-60% redundancy is not an infrequent phenomenon. The problem is
usually  so sizable that the first round of labor force reduction (e.g. 30% in the Chilean railways)  would
probably be within the redundancy estimates obtained by both the engineering and social welfare
approaches. The difference between the two approaches stands out more when redundancy falls  into
the 10-20% range. In this latter situation, the estimates based on ratios given by the "best foreign
practice" may differ sufficiently  from those based on marginal productivity  and shadow prices in the
economy.
4.1.2  Costs and Benefits of Redundancy Schemes
From a strict GNP maximizing  point of view, the reduction of a firm's labor force is justifiable
if the marginal product of labor is less within than outside the enterprise. All the redundancy schemes
that we examined were defensible on this criterion since the marginal product in the firm appears to
have been always zero or negative (the removal of workers never decreased output) and the laid off
workers always faced a significant positive probability of obtaining a productive job. (The case of
Mauritius may be an exception.)
In some of the studies we were also able to take into account the financial benefits (savings
in the  labor cost)  and costs (severance pay and supplementary pension for early retirees) of the
schemes. As can be seen from Table 5, the payback periods calculated with these "transfer payments"
included in the formula were very short and the redundancy schemes fared well on a variety of other
partial indicators of  performance as well. Our  calculations, based on  a variety of more and  less
conservative assumptions, suggest that  the payback period varied from 0.3 to  4.7 years in those
redundancy schemes where this calculation was possible. In other cases the more qualitative evidence
also points to  a  very high rate  of  return. The  main factor driving this impressive result is the
nonrecurrent nature of the severance pay and the recurrent saving of labor cost. The force of this
principle is not  always fully understood, thus occasionally  creating reluctance on  the part of  the
authorities or international organizations to institute or provide funding for redundancy schemes (e.g.
currently in Ghana).
The other  reason for the reluctance of foreign donors such as the World Bank to finance
severance pay is that severance is not viewed as a "productive  purpose" -- a precondition for lending
in the Bank's Articles. As the benefit-cost analysis  itself indicates, severance is logically  a productive
investment. It is concentratred  as a cost at the start of the project and results in an intertemporal
stream of benefits. These benefits are productive in the most basic sense. The redundancy scheme
removes unproductive labor and thus increase the productivity  of the firm. Moreover, so long as the
expected productivity  of the redundant labor is greater outside than within the firm, the productivity
"The  100% labor redundancy occui.ed  prior  to  the  closing of  the  Bulk Sugar Terminal in
Mauritius.28
of the society as a whole (GNP) is increased. The reluctance to finance redundancy on these grounds
is hence logically  misconceived.  It is probably driven by the perception that productive investments
occur (solely) in the capital market. However, redundancy schemes, like human capital, can be highly
productive.
All but one of the schemes we examined achievW.4  the goal of significantly  reducing if not
completely eliminating the redundancy problem for extended periods of time. The most successful
schemes in this respect were those in Brazil, Chile and Mauritius, some schemes in Ghana and the
unezonomic line closures in Yugoslavia.  There is hope that the current Sri Lanka bus scheme will  also
be successful. The one clear cut failure is the Sri Lanka Transport Board scheme, where during the
1980s  employees were induced to leave with compensation and virtually simultaneously  were being
rehired. This case illustrates the importance of government resolve and accountability for success.
Somewhat related  is the case of Yugoslav railways where, given the  overall political and  social
atmosphere  in  the  1970s and  1980s, labor redundancy gradually recurred  after  the  closure of
uneconomic lines.
Most of the successful redundancy schemes also resulted in  a significant improvement in
economic efficiency  and financial performance of the enterprise.  However, as Tables 6 and 7 show,
this is not always  immediately  evident from simple ratio indicators. The labor cost as a percent of total
costs in all modes of transport were reduced, except for the Brazilian (RFFSA) and Ljubljana railways;
the working ratio remained constant or showed improvement in almost all cases (Table 6).  The
productivity  indicators for the railways  show tremendous improvements  in TU/man year in all countries
(Table 7).  The productivity indicators for the buses do show some improvement in the number of
employees per operating bus but this also has to do with the number of working buses, which was
fallen in both Sri Lanka and Ghana.  No improvment  in the traffic per bus indicator is shown in these
two countries.27  Clearly, it is difficult to  associate each of these performance indicators with the
redundancy scheme, holding all else constant.  Various other factors are affecting these measures.
Hence, we can only make the following  general statements: The reduction of redundant labor has had
a significant  impact on enterprise performance when labor cost was a large proportion of total cost or
when labor was replaced with capital-inte sive technology (as in the case of Mauritius).  Given the
importance of labor in total cost in general, a signiWtip*-reduction  in excess labor can by itself result
in a substantial improvement in enterprise efficienc3r. However, more complex schemes that  also
address other aspects of enterprise performance,  such as marketing  and output growth, investment and
pricing policy, tend to have a greater positive effect. Our case studies of Chilean, Mauritian and Sri
Lankan ports as well as Brazilian and Chilean railways also indicate that, from the standpoint of
enterprise efficiency,  a very important aspect of the government employment policy is the reduction
of restrictive work practices.
The most negative aspect of many redundancy schemes is the impact on the affected workers.
Schemes that rely on permanent layoffs tend to lower the laid off workers' incomes, although the
virtually  universal lack of post-layoff  monitoring makes it difficult to gather reliable evidence on this
subject. The incomes of the remaining workers often tend to rise faster than they would have in the
absence of layoffs, as the financially  invigorated enterprises can pay more to motivate the remaining
z7Comparable  productivity  indicators across all of the ports in the study could not be found.29
employees. The overall impact on workers hence depends on the job opportunities elsewhere in the
economy and the relative weight given to the laid off and the remaining employees.
In our studies, the schemes  with the most negative  impact on workers  were those in the Chilean
railway (1975-79), Ghanaian buses (1989-90) and ports (1985-89), Mauritius ports (1980) and  Sri
Lankan ports (1972).  In these schemes people were for the most part laid off during a period of limited
outside employment opportunities and received only modest compensation. Many appear to  have
suffered extended spells of unemployment  and in some cases (e.g. port workers in Mauritius and Sri
Lanka) observers claim that the majority  of the laid off workers never found new employment.  Given
that there were no other forms of a social safety net (e.g. food stamps) in these countries, the welfare
of the workers was clearly poor. Schemes which redeployed or retrained redundant workers (e.g.
Brazil's railway  and Sri Lanka ports in the 1980s  or Yugoslav railways  until 1990) or allowed them to
leave voluntarily obviously placed the worker on  a higher level of welfare than the more abrupt
schemes based on layoffs.
The political cost of redundancy policies and schemes did not appear to be prohibitive in the
cases under consideration. In fact, the political cost was significantly  reduced when the governments
publicized  the underlying reasons and highlighted  the size of the rents earned by the groups imposing
(or  benefitting from)  restrictive work practices (e.g. in  Chile  and  Sri Lanka).  Sometimes the
government (e.g. Brazil and Uruguay) can be assisted by strikes that backfire. If they are handled
carefully  (e.g. providing  alternative transportation for passengers,  as Uruguay did) the government has
a stronger political position for closing  out a line.
It must be stressed, however, that political factors often give rise to redundant labor in the
public sector. Moreover, the potential political cost associated with large scale layoffs  usually  prevents
existing governments from facing the problem. The fact that substantial redundancy schemes tend to
be  adopted  by financially strapped  governments which can  blame  external  lenders or  by new
governments with a strong mandate to reconstruct the economy testifies to the presence of significant
political costs and benefits in this area.
4.2  Methodological and Policy Issues
4.2.1  The Complexity of the Issue
The concept of redundant labor is not a simple one. As we have shown in Chapter 1, the
optimality  of given employment  nnd pay practices depends on a number of factors, including  particular
social preferences as well as the importance of specific human capital, cost of labor turnover, relative
risk aversion  of the worker and the firm,  bargaining,  and asymmetrically  observed effort. In the absence
of these factors, the labor market would be flexible  and competitive,  with labor's marginal product and
wage (for a given skill) being equalized across uses. In this flexible  case labor redundancy would not
arise.
Once some of these complicating  factors are present, optimal employer policies or employer-
worker contracts may  result in marginal  products that are not equalized across uses. Moreover, if wages
are set above the market clearing (shadow  wage) level, profit maximizing  levels cf employment  are too
low from the social (GNP maximizing)  standpoint. This is because the profit maximizing  criterion
dictates that employment be adjusted so that labor's marginal product equals the actual wage, while30
the GNP maximizing  criterion equates the marginal product to the (lower) shadow wage. Depending
on union preferences, collective bargaining can result in deficient or excessive levels of employment
from the social (GNP maximizing)  perspective. It is hence possible for a profit maximizing  employer
to view a given level of employment as excessive,  although from a social perspective it is insufficient.
Similarly,  while the union and profit maximizing  employer may strike an optimal bargain that reflects
the union's willingness  to trade off wages for employment, from the social perspective  the employment
level may be excessive.
The extent of labor redundancy hence depends on the perspective taken in evaluating a given
case. As we have mentioned earlier, from the strict GNP maximization  perspective, redundant labor
ought to  be  reduced to  the point of equality of labor's marginal product within and outside the
enterprise. Yet, this simple rule may be inadequate if the aforementioned factors are relevant. For
instance, if trade unions are legally permitted and the collectively agreed upon wage-employment
bargains reflect union's emphasis on employment (and hence its willingness  to take less in wages),  the
resulting low marginal product of labor in the firm may not warrant government initiated layoffs.'
Similarly,  if the management and union agree on restrictive work practices, the government may find
it philosophically  difficult  to abrogate the contract and eliminate the practices.-"  The government may
also find that a firm paying  high (efficiency)  wages to elicit effort hires too few workers from the social
welfare standpoint. Yet, forcing the firm to hire more workers or preventing layoffs  would undermine
the firm's effort eliciting strategy.
4.2.2  Identification of the Extent of Redundancy
As the foregoing discussion  indicates,  identifying  the extent of redundancy is conceptually not
a simple task. Our view is that in practical policy work the basic social welfare principle of equating
the marginal products of labor (of a given skill) across uses is the best basic yardstick but  that the
resulting estimates of labor redundancy ought to be adjusted for the effects of other relevant factors.
For instance, temporary labor hoarding brought about by the cost of firing and hiring of workers or
by the  expectation of future price or input supply developments may be optimal from both  the
enterprise and the economy-wide  standpoint. Similarly,  in greatly fluctuating demand conditions, the
smoothing of wages and employment may benefit both risk averse workers and risk neutral  SOEs.
Hence, a reasonable approach wi;l strive to equate the marginal products of labor (of a given skill)
across uses in the economy but allow  for optimal temporary deviations along the lines suggested in this
study.
In pac66e,  most policy-related analyses of the extent of labor redundancy rely on average
rather th4p merginal indicators. As we mentioned earlier, consultants, government officials and World
Bank staff tend to use "engineering  (ratio) measures"  such as the enterprise output-labor, capital-labor
and labor cost-total cost ratios, which are then compared to "experts' assessments"  of optimal targets
2'Note if the government forced the SOE management to renege on the employment aspect of the
wage-employment  deal and lay  off workers, in the following  negotiations the union would use its power
to push for higher wages along the marginal product of labor curve. The outcome would be Pareto
inefficient from the management-union standpoint and, if the resulting wage were high, employment
would also be deficient from the social standpoint.
29'The  agonizing of the Chilean government on this issue is an interesting case in point.31
for these variables. Labor redundancy is usually  identified as that reduction in enterprise labor force
that would bring the actual ratios in line with the optimal targets.
This approach is conceptually  inappropriate in that it uses average indicaton (e.g. average labor
productivity)  to detect a phenomenon that occurs on the margin (low marginal productivity  of labor).
While the average and marginal products are usually functionally related, they coincide only under
restrictive technological assumptions. Moreover, the  ratio  approach either  ignores or  treats  only
implicitly  the possibility  for factor substitution and scale changes that the enterprise should undertake
in response to changes in exogenous factors. In fact, in the cases that we examined, the adjustment of
the actual to the target ratios was to be accomplished  mostly  or entirely by the adjustment of the labor
input or labor cost. The possibility  of a major adjustment in the other side of the ratio (e.g. output
scale or capital) was usually  not considered.
The  other  salient  feature  of  the  engineering (ratio)  approach  is  its  reliance on  expert
assessments  of optimal ratios. These optimal ratios usually  correspond to some "best practice" observed
in another  economy. While the  knowledge of practices in more advanced countries is useful as a
yardstick for  comparison, the  cross-country variation  in  factors such  as  terrain,  infrastructure,
technology, and skills make rigid application of external standards questionable.
All these shortcomings of the ratin (engineering) approach of course contrast markedly with
the simplicity  and clarity  of targets that it produces. These targets lend themselves easily  for stipulating
loan conditionality  and specifying  redundancy  schemes, thus accounting for the widespread use of this
approach. Yet, as we indicate, if the engineering approach is to be justified, it must be done on the
basis of sheer convenience and data availability,  rather than conceptua!  desirability  and precision of the
resulting estimates.
For these reasons, our recommendation is to replace or at least complement the engineering
approach with the marginal productivity approach outlined in Section 1.1 of this study. The basic
practical problem with using the marginal productivity approach is of course the fact that  the key
indicator -- the marginal product of labor -- is unobservable.  However, our experience  in this and other
labor market investigations indicates that enterprise  managers usually have a good idea about the
marginal product of labor in individual  departments, divisions  and shops of the firm.  In particular, the
managers confidently identify the number of workers that could be removed without diminishing the
division's or shop's output. To the:r credit, it must be noted that the redundancy schemes that we
examined in this study did not result in a fall in output. The approximate identification of the number
of workers with zero marginal  product hence appears not to be very difficult.  To identify the shadow
wage (marginal product of labor) in the economy and the number of workers in a given enterprise
whose marginal product  falls short  of this value  is perhaps somewhat harder. Yet,  a reasonable
magnitude of the shadow wage can be estimated by country economists on the basis of the available
data  on earnings in  the  formal and  informal sectors, as well as estimates of unemployment and
underemployment in  the  economy. This is especially the  case in view of  the  usually enormous
magnitude of the labor redundancy  problem. Our conclusion is therefore that the marginal  productivity
approach, taking into account the expectations  of future developments  as well as particular institutional
features  discussed above, is the  most  appropriate  methodology for  identifying redundant  labor.32
Whenever posuble, the approach ought to rely not only on expert opinions but also on econometric
estimates.3
A note of caution is in order here. In practice, the extent of labor redundancy is often so
sizable that the first round of labor force reductions is likely to fall within the redundancy estimates
obtained by both the engineering and social welfare approaches.The differences between the two
approaches is likely  to stand out more when redundancy falls  into the 10-20%  of the labor force range.
4.2.3  The Design and Implementation  of Schemes
As our analysis  indicates, the issue of labor redundancy is a complex one and it does not lend
itself to a uniform and simple treatment. In operational work it is hence necessary  to take into account
the specific circumstance of each case in order  to  design the best  approach to  ihe  problem. In
particular, in approaching the problem one  should start with an assessment of the extent of the
problem,  using the methodology discussed above.
The second step should consist of an examination  of the causes of redundancy,  distinguishing
between the  exogenous environmental factors (e.g. state  of the economy, technological progress,
changes in markets), systemic  factors (laws, institutional structures such as trade unions, and accepted
practices) which may be predetermined in some cases but possibly subject to change in others, and
factors and policies that may be better designed to prevent the recurrence of redundancy (e.g. the
financial situation of the government or the enterprise, the autonomy of the SOE, etc.).
In the same exercise one  needs to  carry out  an Identification  of factors that prevent the
adjustment of employment  and/or wages to an eMcient level once redundancy  occurs. The most
important of these usually are restrictive work practices, geographical constraints, labor legislation,
public opinion (social pressure), and custom. An effective approach to  these factors may prevent
redundancy from becoming a problem. External shocks will always cause redundancy to occur but it
is the lack of flexible  response that makes the phenomenon become a protracted and costly problem.
The third step involves  the design and implementation  of an optimal redundancy  scheme.  In
designing and  implementing redundancy  schemes,  one  has  to  take  into  awsunt  both  the
aforementioned conceptual issues and the practical problems that accompany all socially disruptive
projects. On the conceptual side, the evidence from the various cases indicates that the handiing of
redundancy is easier if the government from the outset specifies and obtains support for a clearly
defined employment and pay policy vis a vis the SOEs. In approaching the redundancy problem in
specific SOEs, the government and SOE management achieve a strong position if they first prepare
a  solid case that  identifies the  causes, extent  and  precise location of  redundancy, justifies the
methodology used to arrive at the estimates, and explains why a particular redundancy scheme (e.g.
3See  e.g. Brada (1989),  Card (1986),  Brown  and Ashenfelter (1986),  MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986)
and Svejnar (1986) for examples of econometric studies that provide parameter estimates that are
relevant for identifying  the extent of redundant labor.33
layoffs) is proposed over altematives. A tight link among the various elements of the package (causes,
extent,  and  proposed approach)  makes the proposed scheme operationally superior and  socially
acceptable.
On the practical side, the case studies as well as other evidence suggest that the success of the
scheme often depends decisively  on the cooperation of the affected workers and other parties. This
evidence in turn offers several guidelines for facilitating the agreement on and imple-mentation  of
redundancy schemes.  First, the government should assess if the proposed compensation for the laid off
workers is adequate by established practices and expectations. As the results in Table 5 indicate, since
the cost of severance pay is nonrecurrent  while the benefit of labor cost savings is recurrent, the
financial benefits rapidly exceed the costs of the scheme. The govemment may therefore want to
transcend the usual budgetary concems and offer extra severance to the laid off workers. This is
especially the case if the transfers are limited and do not affect the effort and hence productivity  of
the remaining workers.
The second key to broad acceptability appears to be the availability  of "expert opinions." In the
presence of uncertainty,  incomplete information  and limited  education on the part of workers and trade
union officials,  the confirmation of the extent of redundant labor by reputed experts can significantly
aid the approval of the measure. The expert studies in Ghana and Yugoslavia  are good examples of
this phenomenon.
A related factor is the involvement  of workers and trade unions in designing  the scheme and
their  understanding of the  fact that  the  enterprise  might not  survive without it. The  significant
participation of workers or  their representatives in the preparation of the schemes in Mauritius,
Yugoslavia and the bus companies in Ghana was crucial for the passage of the schemes. 3' Similarly,
the personnel chief of EMPORCHI in Chile reported that her intensive consultations with workers
overcame much opposition to the large scale layoff  scheme. The last example is particularly significant
because the consultations took place in an industrial relations environment that did not require worker
involvement in an area of managerial prerogative.
In many  developing  economies capital markets are imperfect and laid-off  workers may not have
an easy access to capital for the launching of new economic activities.  In these circumstances,  it may
be socially as well as economically  desirable for the government to step in and provide seed capital -
either in the form of greater severance pay (as in Chilean ports) or in terms of loans (Chilean railway).
There seems to be no universal evidence on whether the optimal severance payment should be one
shot (thus allowing  the laid off workers better to start their own business) or in the form of long-term
periodic payments (thus providing longer sustenance). Indeed, economic theory suggests that  the
former scheme is better for enterprising individuals  and the latter for those who are either risk averse
or  fiscally irresponsible. It  hence  appears that  allowing fiscally responsible workers to  self-select
themselves into one of these (actuarially identical) schemes, may be the best general approach. In
situations  of  high  economic  uncertainty  and  nonexistence  of  a  social  security  system,  the
encouragement  of  the  system of  periodic payments may be  desirable.  However,  in  situations
31Note that  the union was also closely consulted in the case of Ghana  ports but workers (as
opposed to union leaders) rejected the scheme. As this result indicates, the structure and cohesion of
the union is also an important factor that needs to be taken into account.34
characterized by high inflation or government instability the system of periodic payments may be
perceived as unreliable and hence unacceptable to the workers.
Government provision of credit is also justified when the redundancy schemes are sound but,
in view of existing  coliective bargaining agreements, the SOEs have to pay significant  severance in the
case of layoffs. If the capital market does not  provide enterprises the necessary credit,  the high
financial  rate of return of the redundancy  scheme may  justify the government and international lending
institutions to step in and provide the credit. For instance, the 1990-91  situation in Ghana is one where
such a step would be both socially and financially  desirable.
In economic activities with significant  rents (e.g. ports), workers frequently feel that theY  have
acquired certain property rights to these rents. They are therefore reluctant to leave employment even
if given a relatively generous compensation (as for instance in Chile, Ghana, and Mauritius). The
conceptual difficulties associated with handling such cases have been mentioned earlier. In practice,
once an agreement on labor force reduction has been obtained, experience suggests  that the severance
payments  should be disbursed only when the workers return all enterprise property and legally  accept
the outcome. The Chilean and Ghanaian port experiences  also suggest that worker acceptance is more
likely if the payment of the full severance is available only during a specific and well publicized period,
with the amount of payment declining with time after the deadline. These elements were part of the
scheme in  Chile but  not in Ghana.  While in Chile the severance package and the  outcome was
generally accepted, in Ghana it was rejected and resulted in a protracted legal battle.
If the labor redundancy scheme is part of a measure that has an impact on a broader segment
of the society (e.g. the closure of uneconomic railway  lines), it is important to take steps to overcome
public  discontent that could derail the project. The Yugoslavs  and Uruguyans  appear to have succeeded
remarkably  in this respect, involving  the community  and diffusing the negative preconceptions of the
concerned citizens. Community involvement also helped in devising the best alternatives for local
transport and for economic activities of the displaced workers.
Opposition to the scheme is also reduced if the scheme is part of a larger effort that contains
other complementary  measures. In Ghana, the larger effort came in the form of a widespread reduction
of excess labor in the civil and educational services as well as in SOEs. 32 In Chile and Sri Lanka, the
complementary  schemes included liberalization  and entry of new firms as well as general reduction in
the size of government. The positive impact of the  package on output  and efficiency was hence
magnified and the entry of new private firms (e.g. in ports) meant that the absorption of laid off
workers into productive activities was easier.
Macroeconomic conditions will influence the  type of  scheme chosen.  For  example, the
complementary  measures  mentioned  above  are  especially necessary  during  periods  of  high
unemployment. It is for instance generally  easier to negotiate a reduction of restrictive labor riractices
32While  the larger scale of layoffs may make the absorption of laid off workers more difficult and
thus weaken worker support, it also makes the measure fairer. In the Ghanaian case there was a
general perception that the public and educational services  as well as many SOEs suffered from severe
labor redundancy and the need to take a fair action was broadly accepted. Note also that, while a large
scale effort requires more sizable funding of severance, the ultimate saving is also magnified.35
in the downturn of the business  cycle when the labor market is slack, provided the employer is %illing
to yield on layoffi and rely on voluntary separations instead.
Interestingly, our  study  suggests that  whether  the  labor  force  reduction  is  voluntary
(compensation-induced  quits) or involuntary  (layoffs) does not affect the overall success in eliminating
redundancy. It does suggest that if voluntary separations are used, incentives may need to be higher.
TIhis  is especially  the case if redundancy is caused by restrictive  work practices.  Moreover, if redundancy
is caused by excess staff in specific categories and quits are to be induced by incentives, the incentives
should be restricted to the specific groups to avoid unwat ed brain drain and limit the cost of the
scheme.
Finally,  it is necessary to stress that in most cases a large variety of labor redundancy schemes
is potentially available and that different ones may  be optimal in different systemic  and environmental
settings. Hence early retirement may be appropriate if the age structure and skill of the labor force is
favorable and layoffs are socially  unacceptable (as was the case for instance in Brazil and Yugoslavia).
Layoffs  and spinoffs  of activities  to private contractors may be socially  appropriate solutions in systems
that place low value on job security and emphasize the growth of private initiative (e.g. in Pinochet's
Chile). Redeployment and imaginative  job creation was used successfully  in Uruguay and Yugoslavia,
while hiring freezes with (or without) retraining appear to be beneficial short-term-,  measures in many
countries.
In sum, the design of an optimal redundancy scheme needs to rely on a thorough and widely
respected assessment of the  extent  and causes of  redundancy as well as of  factors that  prevent
automatic  (albeit  perhaps  gradual) adjustment of  employment to  an  efficient level. Using this
information, the design and implementation must take into account the following  factors:
- The nature of the normal decision making  process (participatory vs. top-down);
- The desirability  of a voluntary  vs. involuntary  approach;
- The need for a slow vs. rapid approach;
-The possibilities  (demographic,  legal, skill-mix  related, etc.) for using retirement  as an effective means
of reducing redundancy;
- The possibilities  and desirability  of redepioyment;
- The desirability  of relying on hiring restrictions  or hiring freeze;
- The expediency of (re)training part of the redundant labot force;
- The need and possibilities for reducing  restrictive  work practices;
- The possibility  of achieving adjustment to an optimal employment level in the context of a larger
process such as privatization  of the enterprise;
- The optimal nature of the compensation  package  for the affected employees.36
Since a successful redundancy scheme has to balance the twin goal of economic efficiency  and
political acceptability,  the architects of any given scheme need to use the degrees of freedom offered
by these factors and design a scheme that maximizes  efficiency within the constraints given by the
country's system and environment.
4.2.4  Monitoring, Evaluation and Policy Adjustment
One of the most striking findings of our investigation is that few redundancy schemes were
subject to ongoing monitoring and none went through a rigorous expost evaluation. 33 Political factors
(e.g. reversals) were  the  reason  for  this  shortcoming in  some  cases but,  more generally, labor
redundancy schemes do not appear to have been treated conceptually on par with other economic
projects. Frequently, once the "battle to launch the project had been won", the authorities did not
deem it necessary to allocate resources for monitoring and future assessment.
Our conceptual framework  and the practical evidence suggest that monitoring,  evaluation and
optimal adjustments ought to be an integral part of redundancy schemes. Indeed, many schemes have
important intertemporal components and optimal implementation requires monitoring,  diagnostics  and
adjustments in view of unexpected variations in relevant external factors. Apart from enabling the
government officials and SOE managers to  react to  external changes, monitoring and evaluation
activities provide the necessary incentives for all the concerned parties to  live up to  their original
agreements and jointly agree on optimal adjustments.
4.2.5  Sustainability
One of the most important lessons stemming from our studies is that the sustainability  of the
reduced employment levels  depends on the willingness  of the SOEs and the government in general not
to (re-) hire workers after the completion of the exercise. Tne problem is usually one of keeping the
commitment in the face of specific pressure groups and avoiding unpublicized policy reversals (e.g.,
violation of the hiring freeze). Adopting clear-cut measures that help maintain the commitment may
be very useful. The decision by the  Ghana  Railway Corporation  to  circulate monthly computer
printouts with the names and addresses of all new hires has for instance virtually  eliminated hiring of
relatives and friends - a  major source of illicit hiring in the past. In this context, an important
institutional feature  is the existence of a well functioning personnel office. Up-to-date and easily
accessible information on the current structure of the labor force, with detail on each employee, is
crucial for the design, implementation and sustenance of a given employment policy.34  Another set
of measures which would work toward this end is to give enterprises more autonomy from central
government control and at the same time clearly define narrower productivity related goals for the
enterprises.  Privatization of the entire enterprise is the final step along this continuum and would of
course  rid the  government of  any future  concern about  labor redundancy within their  domain.
3The observed monitoring was usually undertaken  in  the  presence  of  a  World Bank  loan
conditionality.
34It  is claimed that there were often cases when the same person that had been compensated to
retire permanently from the Sri Lanka Transport Boards in the 1980s  was rehired by another board
soon thereafter  because of a lack of a good personnel system.37
However, privatization of various services (e.g. maintenance of the trains in Chile) can (but may not
always) assist in managing a problem of excess labor and reducing labor costs to the government.
Another important element of the scheme  is the meticulous  elimination  of work rules and other
practices if their elimination was  called for in the redundancy scheme. The strategies vary from drastic
elimination ot  all rules at once (e.g. Chile) to gradualist where one work rule is chipped away with
negotiation (e.g. Mauritius). As Harding (1990) points out, the difficulty  with the gradualist approach
is that advances in one area may have to be at the expense of giving  way in another (which is clearly
happening in the Mauritius case). Again, the joint government and SOE management determination
to carry out the scheme and make its results stick aids the long term success of the project (e.g. in
Chile and Ghana). A lukewarm  commitment (as for instance in Yugoslavia  and Sri Lanka in the early
and mid-1980s)  easily derails the scheme.
4.3  Conclusions
Our investigation  indicates that labor redundancy in public sector transportation enterprises is
frequently a very serious and costly problem. The analysis  of this problem has been neglected, largely
because conceptually it is not a simple and easily identifiable phenomenon and because its treatment
is frequently controversial from the social welfare standpoint  and costly politically. Governments
therefore tend to approach the problem only in extreme circumstances (e.g. budgetary stress or near
complete breakdown of the transport system).  The solutions are then hammered out  in a tense
environiment  and often they are not embodied within a long-term vision of the optimal employment
and pay practices for the enterprise, or public sector at large.
The first step in designing  a redundancy scheme is to be clear about what the optimal pay and
employment policies should be in a given system and ei.vironment. The study discusses  some of these
policies and their tradeoffs and emphasizes the need for designing a redundancy scheme and policies
to work toward this ideal.
The study presents a framework for identifying labor redundancy within different countries
whose social  welfare functions vary with respect to the weight given to efficiency  vs. equity. A rule-of-
thumb for identifying  labor redundancy is developed for those cases where GNP maximization  is the
goal of a government.  It is shown that the private and the social assessment of the extent of labor
redundancy can differ substantially and that the former is not always the appropriate measure.
The analysis  of the experiences of state-owned transport enterprises in six countries suggests
that redundancy schemes can have a high rate of return and can be designed in a socially acceptable
way. Given the long-run savings on the wage bill, compensation to laid-off employees can be set at
fairly high levels and still enable the government to recoup their costs in a relatively short time.  Cash-
flow problems however may require the assistance of international donor agencies. Attention needs
to be given to how this compensation is administered as this can make a difference to the welfare of
the worker.38
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Sources of Labor Redundancy and the Principal
Systemic and Environmental Features
Systemic  and Environmental  Factors
Change in
Transposi  Restrictive  Government  Avg.  Annual
Mods  Souc  of  Workets  Work  Government  Philosophy  from  GNP
Country  (Enterprie)  lAbor Redundancy  Unionized  Rules  Philosophy  Previous Regime  Growth
BRAZIL  Raltmay  orgmuzational  changes,  polidcal  yes  some  1964484:  market  yes  1965-48:
(RFPSA)  appointments,  technological  oriented militazy  5.8%; 1981S
1965-88  change competitdou  from road  dictatondip;  83:  -4%
tranporttion  for passenger  198548: les  market
transport  oriented democratic
government
CHILE  Ports  decision to privatize  part of  no  none  19734S9:  market  yes  1981: 5.3%;
(EMPORCHI)  serices  oriented, military  1982-83:
1981  dictatorship  .7.5%
Ports  techological change, restrictive  yes  smay  *  yes
(Private Sector)  labor practice
1981
Railway  technological  change,  compedtion  yes  some  yes  1975: -IZ9%/,;
1975.79  from road transportation  1976: 3.5%;
1977.79:  8.8%
GHANA  Raihay  colonial legacy,  layoff forbidden  yes  some  1975-89:  socialist;  yes
1975-90  by law, government  subsidization  1983-90:  market
of losses,  technological  chnge,  oriented social-
deterioration of capital stock,  democratic
competition from road transport,
institudonal change
Busts  lax  hiring  policies, polidcal  yes  none  yes  5%
(Sli)  pressure,  skill composition of
1989-90  initial labor force, fall in the
number of bues, social
unacceptability  of layoffs
Buses  same a  STC  yes  none  yes  5%
(CES)
1989.90
Ports  historical  inability  of management  yes  some  '  yes  5%
1983549  to lay off stafl, subsidiztion of
losses,  presence of economic
rents; merger  of two  stiltuitons
social orientation of government,
mechanization
MAURMUS  Ports  new  sugr  terminal (technological  yes  yes  ocialist however  in  -8.8%
1980  change)  1979  became  market
oriented
SRI LANKA  Ports  reduced taffic demand due to  yes  yen  socialist,  state  yes  209%
1972  national policy, and later  domination of
conuieduzon  economy
Bus  polidcal preue  deterioradon of  yes  none  market oriented  yes  5.0% 
191146  buse  competion  from private
secw
Bus  decision  to privaie  yes  none  market  oriented  no  1.8%
1990
YUGOSLAVIA  Railway  clsue  of uneconomic  lines,  yes  none  socialist labor  yes  1969-79:5.6%
196946  dieselutian  & eectrification,  maaged;  197386:  1979-5:
political prere  market oriented;  -0.9%
1986.
Railway  political pree,  fai  n trffic,  yes  none  social presure to  yes  198149:0.6%
1910l  ognnztio  chae  inacrese  employment;
1986499:  maret
orientedTable 2
Magnitude of Layoffs (Retrenchement)
Tnraport  Mode  Extent of Labor  Number of Worken  % of InitiaI  Time Pranse
Country  Enterprise  Redundancy  (%)  laid  Off  Labor Force  (no. Yean)
BRAZiL  Railway  87,138  60%  23
(RFFSA)
19658-






Railvay  13,000  50%  4
1975-79
GHANA  Railay  1,200  30% (197846)  8
1975-90  15% (1987-90)  3
Buses  821  40%  2
(STC)
1989-90
Buses  884  1
(CES)
1989-90
Ports  50%  791 (1985-88)  14% (1985-8)  4
1985489  1,793  (1989)  36% (1989)  1
MAURITIUS  Ports  66%  2,609  66%  1
1980
SRI LANKA  Ports  3,500  7  1
1972
Buses  11,238  17%  4
1981486
Buses  39%  11,500  23%  1
1990-91
YUGOSLAVIA  Railway  none (some early  5-15
196946  retirement)
Raihwy  11%  '  2
198049^i  li  i  lj  1S 82  ]S  1  131
- T  f  1  ,  Ig  ,  1!  g1  Ni.l2
Iji  -~  _  V  S-_ > 
:  t  11  a  aj  i  a  i]  ag  i  X  ,  aa  {X 
|  }FI- $I  F0  X2  5tTable 4
Types and Amount of Compensation In the Redundancy Schemes
Pension  Cost per lAid-
Trasport  Mode  Compensdon  Sevemntce  Loan  (MilL % of  Total  off Employee
Coumtiy  (Eaterpise)  PAY  PAY  Available  salary)  Cost USS  USS
BRAZIL  Railway  (RFFSA)  employee'a  6 to 7 months per yr. of pre.  no  100%  after 35
1965-88  contribudon to  1965  setvkIe,  during 197641;  yr  semvice  (as
special fund  6 months  after 198Z  of 1976)
CHILE  Porn  6 months (in six installments)  no  7040%
(EMPORCHI)  for those not eligible for
1981  pension
Porm  10-30  months  no  S30-70  Approx S12-
(Private Sector)  million  19,000  (to buy
1981  union rule
book)
Raihway  I monthtyear  of  6 months  yes
1975-79  service
GHANA  Railway  24  months of base  no  S1.5 tmillion
1975-90  pay per year of  (end of 1989)
service
Buses (STC)  3-6 months of pay  1.5.3 months of pay per year  no
1989-90  per year of service of service
Buses (CES)  Same  as STC  Same asSTC  no  S510,000  $577
1989-90  (1989)
Ports  25-5 months of  no  S3 million  S1,887
198549  basic salary per year
of srvice
MAURMUS  Ports  S months of service  no  66% for those
1980  with 15+ years
ervice
SRI LANKA  Ports  5 mo.yr. of past  n.a  no  RS Z887,500
1972  service  (7.5 months  in 1972
= maximum)  (maximum)
Buses  S moJyr.  of past  n.a  no  RS 174.3
1981496  service  plus I  milion in
mo4r. of denied  1981
service  (mammum
= RS  20,000  or 24
months, whichever
is lens)
Buse  5 mo./yr.  of past  a.  yes  S80 milUlon  84,000
1990  service  plus I moJ  (eat total)
yr. of denied  (some to pay
service,  (min = 6  for bues)
Mo's;  mau = actual
denied salg)
YUGOSIAVIA  Railway  Yes for early  no
1969-86  retired (varied  by
rtgiom  and time.)  no
Railway  No if redeployed.
1980Table  5
Benefits  and  Costs
Skill
Tant_at  Improvement  in  Improved Financial  Shortage  Payback
Mode  Redundancy  Reoccuretce of  efficiency  of  Performnce  of  Polibcal  After  Period
County  (Enterprbe)  Reduced?  Redundancy?  enteaprise?  Enterpria?  Costs  Scheme?  (Yeaz),
BRAZIL  Railway  yes  no  yes  yes  zero  yes
RFPSA)
196548
CHILE  Pots  yes  so  yes  low  no
EMPORCHI
1981
Ports  yen  no  yes  low  no
(Private Sector)
1981
Raihay  somewhat  no  yes  high  no  0.5.1.7
1973-79
GHANA  Railway  somewhat  no  yes  somewhat  some  1.1-3.2
1975-90
Ban  somewhat  no  not much  zero
(gmp
1989-90
Bumca  somewhat  no  some  low
(CES)
1989-90
PorT  sigiricantly  no  yen  yen  ?  no  1.64.7
198549
MAURITIUS  Ports  yes  no  yes  some  yes (not due  0.3-1.3
1980  to scheme)
SRILANKA  Ports  somewhat  no  yen  ?  ?
1972
Buse  no  yes  no  no
1981-86
Busa  should not  ?  ?  poaibly
1990
YUGOSlAVIA Radway  yes  yes  not much  little  no
196946
Rawy  somewhat;  now  yes  not much  little  no
190  estimated  at
11%
The calclations  are bued  on equation  (1) in text,  with  varfing estimates  of R and R.Table 6
Financial Results
Transport Mode
Coutsy  Baetrpris.  LAbor  Cot  as  % Total Operating Costs  Working Rato
Before  After  Before  After
BRAZL  Railway  36.5  56.7  1.6'  1,b  t1.  1 Ob
(RFFSA)  (1970)  (1988)  (1970)  (1970)  (1988)  (1980)
196548
CHILE  Ports  60.0  30.0'  1.0  .8
(EMPORCHI)  (1980)  (1982)  (1980)  (1981)
1981
Railway  a.  2.8  5d  Id
1975-79  (1973)  (1974)  (1980)
GHANA  Railw  57.7  68.0  Zl-2.7d  I3-I.Sd
1975-90  (1980-42)  (1987489)  (198042)  (198749)
Buses  36.1  324  lId  1.3d
(STC)  (1986)  (1989)  (1986)  (1989)
1989-90
Busa  21.0  17.2  1 Id  1 Id
(CES)  (1988)  (1989)  (1988)  (1989)
1989-90
Port  66.4  49.0  o.d$  05d
198549  (1985)  (1989)  (1985)  (1989)
SRI LANKA  Ports  D.A.  69.0  m.a  0.6
1972  (1981)  (1981)
Buses  36.8  34.7  .9  1.0
1981-86  (1979)  (1985)  (1979)  (1985)
YUOOSLAVIA  Belgade  37.5  40.2  1 .Id  I.Id
Railways  (1968)  (1989)  (1968)  (1989)
Ljubljaua  37.5  45'5  IOd  I.Od
Railways  (1968)  (1989)  (1968)  (1989)
Sarajevo  419  33 9  9d  1.3d
Railw  (1968)  (1989)  (1968)  (1989)
Zagreb  36.4  60.3  IOd  0.6d
Railways  (1968)  (1989)  (1968)  (I989)
a.c.  =  not available
a Without nomalization.
b with normalizaion
c All reduction  wan in cat  of maual  worken in Chile (fio0  50% to 20%) not  n 'otber staff  (which  remained at 10% throusbout).
d Openrag  ratio  (includes depreciation)Table 7
Productivity Indicators
Raitway  Bus
Transport Mode  TU/man  year  Vehicle km per  Bus  Employee Per
County  Enterprpe  (000)  Day  Operating Bus
Before  After  Before  After  Before  After
BRAZIL  Railway  143.0  598.2
(RFFSA)  (1964)  (1984)
196548
CHILE  Railway  185.2  260.9
1975-79  (1974)  (1980)
GHANA  Railway  2S8.2  662.2
1975-90  (1984)  (1989)
Buses  522  442  32  29
(SWC)  (1987)  (1989)  (1987)  (1989)
1989-90
Bus  n.  .a.  26  17
(CES)  (1987)  (1989)
1989-90
SRI  LANKA  Buses  250  217  11.5  10.5
1981-86  (1980)  (1987)  (1980)  (1987)
Buses  184  ?  13.1  ?
1990-91  (1989)  (1989)
YUGOSLAVIA  Railway
1969-86
Belgrade  217  290
(1968)  (1989)
Ljubljana  240  372
(1968)  (1989)
Sarajevo  221  357
(1972)  (1989)
Zagreb  275  323
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